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Abstract: 
In 1996/1997 Bulgaria was hit by a severe financial crisis, spreading from a banking crisis to a 
currency crisis. While being widely neglected by the financial crisis literature and the 
international discussion we argue that the Bulgarian Financial Crisis might serve as an illustrative 
example of a twin crisis primarily (but not only) due to systematic moral hazard behaviour of the 
banking sector. Thus, the Bulgarian Financial Crisis might be closer to the story of third 
generation moral hazard models of currency crises than the Asian Crisis. We also show how 
Bulgaria managed to overcome the crisis by introducing a second generation currency board 
allowing the central bank to act as a strictly limited lender of last resort thereby (hopefully) 
making the country less prone to a financial crisis in the future. 
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Non-technical summary: 
 
During the last decade a considerable number of countries experienced some sort of financial 
crises, most prominent among them the European exchange rate crisis of 1992-3, the Tequila 
crisis of 1994-5, the Asian crisis of 1997-8 and the Brazilian crisis 1998-9. Very recently, 
Argentina decided to give up its currency board arrangement and decided to let the Argentine 
peso devalue against the former reserve currency, the U.S. Dollar. Thus, the crisis problem was 
one of the dominant problems of the 1990’s (Bordo et al. (2001), p. 53) and – at least at a first 
glance – it seems not to be surprising that both, the public as well as the scientific community 
started caring about the crisis issue. Even if the impression that the crisis problem grew more 
severe during the last decade might be wrong it is out of the question that the recent crises 
triggered the development of a considerable number of theoretical models trying to explain why 
financial crises occur and how they might spread to other countries.  
In this paper we deal with a crisis, that has widely been neglected in the (international) financial 
crisis literature up to now: the Bulgarian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997. The relatively low level 
of international interest in the Bulgarian crisis might have different causes. One of the major 
reasons surely is that Bulgaria is a small country that neither was nor actually is part of the 
European Community. In addition to that Bulgaria is not an important trade partner of the major 
European countries and did not even face significant foreign direct investments. Thus, 
international investors did neither worry very much about a possible Bulgarian crisis nor did they 
fear that such a crisis could infect other economies of international investors’ interest. Last but 
not least the Asian Crisis started to evolve soon after the Bulgarian Financial Crisis and attracted 
almost all public and scientific interest. Soon after the onset of the Asian Crisis it was noticed 
that first- and second generation  models of currency crises were only partially capable of 
explaining the Asian Crisis. This shortcoming resulted in the recognition that the banking sector 
might have played an important role in the Asian Crisis and led to the development of a new 
generation of financial crisis models, the so-called third generation models. Only a few years 
later serious doubts evolved whether the banking sector played a decisive role with respect to 
causing the Asian Crisis. Krugman, who himself inspired one of the two major strands of third 
generation models (so-called moral hazard models), recently proposed a different point of view William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
when focusing on the role of companies’ balance sheets in determining their ability to invest, and 
that of capital flows in affecting the real exchange rate.  
We suppose that the low degree of interest that has been spent to the Bulgarian Crisis is a 
shortcoming since this crisis might serve as an illustrative example for a so-called “twin crisis” 
(i.e. almost simultaneous occurring banking and currency crisis), as explained by many third 
generation currency crisis models. We argue that the Bulgarian Financial Crisis can best be 
classified as a twin crisis primarily (but not only) due to substantial moral hazard behavior of the 
banking sector, as described by the theoretical models of Dooley (1997) and Krugman (1998). 
Thus, the Bulgarian Financial Crisis might be closer to Dooley’s (1997) and Krugman’s (1998) 
story than the Asian Crisis actually is. The Bulgarian example is also useful with respect to learn 
about the possibilities to overcome a financial crisis and the design of a financial system in a 
transition country that is (hopefully) less prone to financial crises. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decade a considerable number of countries experienced some sort of financial 
crises, most prominent among them the European exchange rate crisis of 1992-3, the Tequila 
crisis of 1994-5, the Asian crisis of 1997-8 and the Brazilian crisis 1998-9. Very recently, 
Argentina decided to give up its currency board arrangement and decided to let the Argentine 
peso devalue against the former reserve currency, the U.S. Dollar. Thus, the crisis problem was 
one of the dominant problems of the 1990’s (Bordo et al. (2001), p. 53) and – at least at a first 
glance – it seems not to be surprising that both, the public as well as the scientific community 
started caring about the crisis issue. Even if the impression that the crisis problem grew more 
severe during the last decade might be wrong
5 it is out of the question that the recent crises 
triggered the development of a considerable number of theoretical models trying to explain why 
financial crises occur and how they might spread to other countries.
6  
In this paper we deal with a crisis, that has widely been neglected in the (international) financial 
crisis literature up to now: the Bulgarian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997. The relatively low level 
of international interest in the Bulgarian crisis might have different causes. One of the major 
reasons surely is that Bulgaria is a small country that neither was nor actually is part of the 
European Community.
7 In addition to that Bulgaria is not an important trade partner of the major 
European countries and did not even face significant foreign direct investments. Thus, 
international investors did neither worry very much about a possible Bulgarian crisis nor did they 
fear that such a crisis could infect other economies of international investors’ interest. Last but 
not least the Asian Crisis started to evolve soon after the Bulgarian Financial Crisis and attracted 
almost all public and scientific interest. Soon after the onset of the Asian Crisis it was noticed 
that first- and second generation models of currency crises were only partially capable of 
explaining the Asian Crisis. This shortcoming resulted in the recognition that the banking sector 
might have played an important role in the Asian Crisis and led to the development of a new 
generation of financial crisis models, the so-called third generation models. Only a few years 
                                                 
5 Compare the analysis by Bordo et al. (2001) for his aspect. 
6 We will review this literature in the second section in length. 
7 In fact, Bulgaria currently prepares to be admitted for EU-accession in the second round of EU-eastern-
enlargement. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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later serious doubts evolved whether the banking sector played a decisive role with respect to 
causing the Asian Crisis. Krugman (1999a), who himself inspired one of the two major strands of 
third generation models (so-called moral hazard models), recently proposed a different point of 
view when focusing on the role of companies’ balance sheets in determining their ability to 
invest, and that of capital flows in affecting the real exchange rate.  
We suppose that the low degree of interest that has been spent to the Bulgarian Crisis is a 
shortcoming since this crisis might serve as an illustrative example for a so-called “twin crisis” 
(i.e. almost simultaneous occurring banking and currency crisis), as explained by many third 
generation currency crisis models. We argue that the Bulgarian Financial Crisis can best be 
classified as a twin crisis primarily (but not only) due to substantial moral hazard behavior of the 
banking sector, as described by the theoretical models of Dooley (1997) and Krugman (1998). 
Thus, the Bulgarian Financial Crisis might be closer to Dooley’s (1997) and Krugman’s (1998) 
story than the Asian Crisis actually is. The Bulgarian example is also useful with respect to learn 
about the possibilities to overcome a financial crisis and the design of a financial system in a 
transition country that is (hopefully) less prone to financial crises.  
The paper is organized as follows: the second section deals with an overview of the theoretical 
literature on financial crises. In the third section we describe the process of transformation in 
Bulgaria from a centrally planned to a market economy from 1990 to 1996. Thereby we focus on 
the development of basic macroeconomic variables like GDP, unemployment, international trade 
and inflation. We also shed a light on the development of the process of privatisation, the banking 
sector and the specific role of  the central bank in the transitional phase. The fourth section is 
devoted to the 1996/1997 Bulgarian Financial Crisis starting out with a severe banking crisis and 
later on leading to a currency crisis (thereby reinforcing the problems of the banking sector). 
After a description of the dynamics of 1996/1997 we make an attempt at classifying the 
Bulgarian crisis with respect to the theoretical models reviewed in section 2. Section 5 deals with 
the Bulgarian way to resolve the crisis and to stabilize the economy by introducing a currency 
board arrangement. Special attention is attached to the peculiarities of the Bulgarian currency 
board arrangement that retained some flexibility in order to be able to fulfil a strictly limited role 
as a lender of last resort. The paper closes with a summary of the main arguments and some 
conclusions. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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2. Theory of financial crises 
Principally there are at least two different sorts of financial crises: currency and banking crises. In 
this paper we make use of the term “currency crisis” whenever an exchange rate heavily devalues 
in a short period of time. Often such a currency devaluation happens as the result of a so-called 
speculative attack, i.e. the sudden purchase of large volumes of the referring currency. We will 
use the t erm “banking crisis” whenever a substantial number of banking institutions goes 
bankrupt and/or a substantial amount of bank deposits are lost by failing banks.
8 Often banking 
crises are inducing also solvent banks to fail because of illiquidity problems. 
To be able to classify the Bulgarian crisis of 1996-7 it is necessary to give an  overview on the 
existing literature on the crisis literature, first. When a country or a group of countries suffered a 
currency crisis it is often claimed by the country’s representatives that the crisis is an act of 
irrationality or, at least, an act of unfairness. The scientific literature on currency crises engaged 
in developing models showing that this claim is regularly not true, i.e. in these models currency 
crises are typically the result of rationally acting agents. Within the crisis literature it is standard 
now to distinguish between so called “first-“, “second-“ and “third-Generation” models. 
Recently, some kind of fourth-generation model seems to evolve. 
 
2.1 First generation models 
The first formal crisis models build up on work of Salant and Henderson (1978) on the 
possibilities to stabilize commodity prices via an international agency buying and selling these 
commodities at fixed prices. Salant and Henderson (1978) argue that such a stabilization system 
might be subject to a speculative attack whenever the price of the commodity that would prevail 
in the absence of a stabilization scheme is above the agency’s target price. In such a situation 
speculators have an incentive to buy large amounts of the commodity for the fixed price since 
they know that the agency has to give up the stabilization efforts as soon as the agency runs out 
of the commodity. When the speculative attack succeeds, the market price will rise to the shadow 
price letting the speculators with capital gains. The canonical model of financial crises, as laid out 
initially by Krugman (1979), simply mimics Salant and Henderson’s story. Instead of commodity 
                                                 
8 Compare e.g. Miller (1996, p. 384) for a similar definition. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
  4 
prices, the government tries to fix the exchange rate, e.g. to enhance international trade with 
major trade partners. To protect the exchange rate peg, the central bank makes use of its stock of 
foreign exchange reserves. On the other hand the government might be interested in financing its 
fiscal deficit via monetary expansion. Since the demand for money does not change, individuals 
carry no interest in holding additional domestic currency and thus exchange it for foreign 
currency denominated assets. Whenever the government continues to finance its fiscal deficits via 
monetary expansion the stock of reserves will constantly decrease and, in final consequence, will 
lead to an abandonment of the exchange rate peg. Thus, it is exactly the inconsistency between 
the two goals of fixing the exchange rate and financing a fiscal deficit via monetary expansion 
that might cause a currency crisis. Flood and Garber (1984) showed that the abandonment of the 
currency peg typically will be enforced by a speculative attack of rationally acting market 
participants. As soon as the shadow flexible exchange rate, i.e. the exchange rate that would 
prevail in the absence of the currency peg, is above the fixed parity, domestic speculators can 
profit in an attack by purchasing foreign exchange from the central bank at the fixed price and 
reselling it at the market-determined price. However, competition between speculators will 
ensure that the exchange-rate peg will collapse as soon as the shadow exchange rate equals the 
currency peg. This kind of currency crisis is often called a “fundamental crisis” since it is a 
fundamental reason  - the existence of a large fiscal deficit - that makes it impossible for the 
central bank to further stabilize the exchange rate. Without such a fundamental reason no 
currency crisis will occur in these models. 
The problem with the First-Generation models of currency crises is that they represent the 
government’s policy in a very simplistic way. In spite of being able to predict that the policy mix 
of pegging the exchange rate while financing a budgetary deficit via monetary expansion will 
lead to an abandonment of the currency fixation the government sticks to this policy thereby 
forcing the central bank to try to defend the parity up to the last unit of reserves. This somewhat 
unrealistic assumption gave rise to the development of second generation models of currency 
crises in which devaluation is a political decision rather than an unavoidable result of policy 
inconsistencies (compare Drazen (1998), p. 3).  
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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2.2 Second generation models 
In order to model the government’s incentives more adequately, Obstfeld (1994) cares about the 
motives of pegging the exchange rate. The government might be interested in facilitating 
international trade and investment by holding the exchange rate constant (in fact, this is one of 
the major objectives of currency unions like e.g. European Monetary Union). Pegging the 
exchange rate might also be interpreted as an attempt to import the credibility in fighting inflation 
of a foreign central bank (compare e.g. Berlemann (1999), p. 217-222) thereby reaching a low 
domestic level of inflation. Krugman (1997, p. 3) argues that the relative value of a currency 
might also be a symbol of national pride and defending this value might be a government’s 
motive when deciding to fix the currency’s price. On the other hand there are several reasons why 
a government might be interested in abandoning a currency peg. As it was already argued earlier, 
there is not much room for an expansionary monetary policy under a currency peg. Nevertheless 
a government might be interested in a lax monetary policy to inflate away a large debt burden 
denominated in domestic currency. It is also possible that downwardly rigid nominal wages are 
causing high unemployment. Again, an expansionary monetary policy could help to overcome 
this problem and therefore might be an argument to give up a currency fixation.  
Altogether, for a country to adopt a fixed exchange-rate regime, the arguments in favour of a 
currency peg must outweigh those against the peg at some point in time. However, this does not 
imply that the situation cannot change in the future. Krugman (1996) argues that even in second-
Generation models a very similar story of a fundamental crises might happen. Therefore he 
supposes a country’s fundamental tradeoff in the arguments for and against a currency peg is 
predictably deteriorating. Thus, it is obvious that the referring country will abandon the peg at 
some time in the future. Similar as in the first-Generation models a speculative attack is likely to 
occur as soon as it could succeed since speculative behaviour offers profits in that situation. As in 
the first-Generation models a currency crisis is in the end the result of an inconsistent policy mix 
of the government in this case. This is true although the referring country might have thought to 
be able to defend the parity for a longer time and thus might feel to  have been forced to abandon 
the peg by irrational speculative transactions. Krugman (1997) states in this respect: “In effect, 
the financial markets simply bring home the news, albeit sooner than the country might have 
wanted to hear it.” William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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Even if the second generation models principally include the scenario drawn by the first 
generation models, they also allow an important additional insight: crises can also occur when 
there is – in fact – no bad development in the fundamentals forcing a country to abandon its 
currency peg. This might happen if a public lack of confidence in the government’s (or central 
bank’s) interest (or ability) to fix the exchange rate itself decreases the chances to succeed in this 
task. Obstfeld (1994) argues that – if people expect an expansionary monetary policy in the future 
(which is possible as soon as the peg will be abandoned) – they will demand high rates of interest 
to anticipate the expected loss of purchasing power. Similarly trade unions will ask for high wage 
increases when expecting higher inflation during the contract period. Such acts of anticipation are 
likely to increase the government’s incentives to abandon the peg. Thus, a currency crisis might 
be somewhat self-fulfilling. When agents start to anticipate the consequences of a possibly 
occurring currency crisis this increases the costs of holding on to the peg thereby further 
increasing the probability of a currency crisis occurring.  
Thus, one of the basic insights of second generation models is that currency crises might also 
occur in countries having no “bad” fundamentals. Whenever market participants expect a 
currency crisis to occur and start speculating against the currency the costs of holding on to the 
peg might increase quickly and induce the government (respective the central bank) to abandon 
the currency fixation. Thus we have multiple equilibria: those in which market expectations allow 
to hold the exchange rate constant and those where market expectations are inconsistent with a 
currency peg.  
Altogether, second generation models seem to deliver some kind of justification for the earlier 
described claims of many countries, hit by a currency crisis, that the crises were not caused by a 
bad development in the countries’ fundamentals but only by some kind of despicable speculation. 
In this context the question arises what exactly makes the market participants starting to speculate 
against a currency. In the end it is not malicious behaviour which causes a speculative attack, it is 
the profit motive together with the expectation that the currency peg will not resist during the 
near future. The speculators only start their attack when they expect that the country gets into 
trouble with at least some probability. Therefore a country typically has to exhibit some kind of 
weakness before its gets subject of an attack (Marion (1999), p. 7), even if this weakness must 
not have resulted in an abandonment of the exchange rate peg with certainty. As Krugman (1997, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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p. 5) states: “It may be small frictions that prevent a subjectively low-probability crisis from 
ballooning into a full-fledged speculative attack.”  
However, it is an interesting question how those countries, who must not but may suffer a crisis 
with some probability get involved into a successful speculative attack, i.e. what exactly induces 
the market participants to start speculating against a currency. Obviously bad news on the 
fundamentals can start an attack. Such an attack is not basically different from those described by 
first generation models. Countries, bad news are coming about, simply change from the group of 
countries who might suffer a crisis to the group who will suffer a crisis because o f bad 
fundamentals. Less obvious, a crisis can also be caused by effects like contagion or herding 
behaviour. 
 
2.2.1 Contagion 
The term “contagion” is not consistently used in the literature. While authors like Masson (1998, 
p. 2) speak of contagion only in the case „where a crisis in one country may conceivable trigger a 
crisis elsewhere for reasons unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals“ we will follow 
Drazen (1998) in using the term “contagion” in a more general sense. Thus, we will talk of 
contagion  whenever an occurring currency crisis in one country makes a currency crisis in 
another country more likely. Again in line with Masson (1998) we call the phenomenon that two 
countries suffer a currency crisis because of the same unobserved common shock (may be at 
different points in time because of regional differences in the susceptibility to infection) 
“monsoonal effects”, although this case is empirically hard to distinguish from cases of 
contagion.  
In the easiest case, contagion effects can be explained by real linkages between two or more 
countries (compare e.g. the formal contagion models of currency crises by Gerlach and Smets 
(1995) and Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)). When one of these countries gets into 
trouble because of bad fundamentals, the situation in countries closely linked to the crisis-country 
might be negatively influenced, too. This sort of contagion is sometimes called “spillover” 
(compare e.g. Masson (1998)). There are several explanations why such spillovers might easily 
occur. Suppose that two countries are on the one hand highly  specialized and on the other hand 
closely linked via extensive trade. As soon as one of the countries gets into problems to stabilize William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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its exchange rate it might choose to tighten monetary policy in order to lower the downward 
pressure on the exchange rate. When doing so, the demand for investment goods from domestic 
and foreign producers will decline and contribute to a recession in the country of the main trade 
partner. Thus, the fundamentals of  the  main trade partner worsen thereby increasing the 
probability that speculators extend their attack on the referring currency. May be more obvious is 
contagion by countries who already gave up their peg. Suppose the case of two countries selling 
very similar products on the world export markets. As soon as one of the countries gives up its 
peg and its currency starts devaluing the other country will get into serious trouble because the 
export sector is not competitive anymore. Again a crisis in one country might trigger a crisis in a 
similar country.  
While the above examples concentrate on fundamentally justified contagion effects (the real 
linkage between the countries is as close that a crisis in one country inevitably causes a crisis in 
the other ones) it is also possible that countries suffer from rational contagion effects without 
fundamentally justified reason. A possible reason for such fundamentally unjustified contagion 
effects is a liquidity shortage of international investors. Whenever international investors face 
large losses in one crisis country (e.g. because of margin calls) they may be forced to rearrange 
their portfolio thereby redrawing money from other countries. The smaller the referring market is 
the more likely such transactions will influence market prices. Thus, contagion effects because of 
international liquidity shortages are likely to happen in small markets like they are present in 
emerging markets countries. 
It might also happen that somewhat “irrational” reasons trigger contagion effects. One 
explanation for such irrational contagion effects is that a group of countries might be perceived 
by market participants as very similar with respect to aspects like e.g. culture though in fact being 
quite heterogeneous. If one country of this group is suffering a currency crisis market participants 
might wrongly expect that other countries of the group are also likely to suffer a crisis and start to 
attack their currencies. This wrong misperception might be due to incomplete or wrong 
information as well as to unobservable characteristics of the referring countries. 
It is also possible that contagion effects occur because of non-economic reasons. Drazen (1998) 
presents a model of political contagion. He argues that fixing the exchange rate might sometimes, 
as for example in the EMU, be primarily a political decision. Thus, it is the desire for political 
integration letting a country enter a system of fixed exchange rates. Taking part in the system is William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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some kind of precondition to take part in the process of political integration. Drazen (1998) 
assumes that the value of taking part in the exchange rate arrangement depends positively on who 
else takes part or may take part. Therefore a country’s decision to hold on to an exchange rate peg 
depends on the respective decision of other countries. Whenever one country decides to leave the 
exchange rate arrangement, the value of staying in the system strictly decreases thereby making 
all other countries more vulnerable to a speculative attack. Thus, this sort of contagion, which 
Drazen (1998) calls “membership contagion”, is driven by negative external effects of the 
decision to use the outside option. 
 
2.2.2 Herding 
In an inefficient foreign exchange market a speculative attack might also be started by so-called 
herding behaviour. The term “herding” in general describes the phenomenon that market 
participants mimic the behaviour of other market participants. In an examination of the 1987 
stock market crash Shiller (1989) found the astonishing result that most individuals sold stocks 
because they observed stock prices to go down. Such a herding behaviour in foreign exchange 
markets can easily lead to a currency crisis.
9 
A first argument why herding behaviour might occur is the existence of the so-called 
“bandwagon effect”. Krugman (1997, p. 5) illustrates this effect by an example of three market 
participants who are invested in a certain country. The first investor has special information on 
the real estate market in the country while the second investor is well informed on the condition 
of the banking sector. The third investor has private information on the government’s finance. 
Now assume that the first investor gets some bad news on the real estate market and, in 
consequence, starts to transfer back at least some of his money. The second investor, who himself 
got no new information on the banking sector might take the first investor’s behaviour as signal 
that the first investor got very bad news indicating that a currency crisis is likely to occur. Thus 
he also starts to sell his assets, thereby increasing the pressure on the exchange rate. Last but not 
least even the third investor, who himself might have got positive new information on the 
condition of the governments finance, is likely to follow the other investors’ example to liquidate 
                                                 
9 Compare the basic models of herding behaviour by Banerjee (1992,1993), Topol (1991) and Orléan (1992, 1993). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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their investments because he is supposing the bad news to be somewhat overwhelming. Thus, the 
fact that the first investor initially received bad news might drive the economy into a currency 
crisis even though the country’s fundamentals did not change substantially. 
A second argument for the relevance of herding behaviour is that many investments in crisis-
prone countries are done by managers of emerging market funds rather than by individuals. The 
reputation and often also the income of the money manager is linked to the comparative success 
of the fund. When a manager of a large fund draws back his money from a certain market it is 
somewhat likely that other managers will follow since there is regularly more to loose than to 
gain when staying in a crisis currency (Krugman (1997, p. 5)).  
A formal model of herding behaviour that builds up on contagion effects caused by international 
liquidity shortages was presented by Calvo (1999). He argues that gathering information about 
emerging market economies typically involves large fixed costs relative to the size of investment 
projects in these countries. Since fixed costs generate economies of scale “financial industry is 
likely to organize itself around clusters of specialists” (Calvo (1999), p. 3). Thus, there are 
typically two subgroups of investors: the informed and the uninformed ones. Moreover the highly 
informed investors are likely to leverage their portfolios by borrowing to finance projects in 
emerging markets. Whenever the informed investors are subject to margin calls the uninformed 
investors might misinterpret the informed investors’ decision to disinvest as a result of bad news 
on the country’s investment projects. Therefore they might decide to redraw their money from the 
country as well thereby causing a currency crisis.
10  
 
2.3 Third generation models 
In first and second generation models currency crisis always have to do with the referring 
countries’ fundamentals: while the basic reason for a currency crises occurring in first generation 
models is a bad development of the fundamentals disabling the government to stick to a pegged 
exchange rate, in second generation models a shift in market expectations on the current state or 
the future development of the countries’ fundamentals might be enough to generate a currency 
crisis. In third generation models an additional possible source of instability is added to the story: 
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the banking sector. Third generation models are somewhat different from first and second 
generation models since they do not necessarily focus on solely explaining currency crises. While 
some of the third generation models predict a currency crisis to occur as the result of a banking 
crisis, others imply a reverse causation.
11 Since currency and banking crises often occur both 
together in these models they are also called “twin crises models”. But there is also the possibility 
that a currency crisis is the result of pretending a banking crisis or the other way round.  
Interestingly enough, theoretical models explaining banking crises are very similar to the earlier 
described first and second generation models of currency crises (compare Marion (1999, p. 6). 
Similar as in first generation models, in Flood and Garber (1981) bank runs are the predictable 
outcome of c ommercial banks’ inconsistent banking policies. In Flood and Garber’s (1981) 
model commercial banks transform deposit liabilities into reserves and long-term bonds and 
promise to pay one unit of high-powered money for each unit of deposits on demand. A bank run, 
for example, might occur as the result of a deflationary central bank policy that undermines the 
bank’s assets’ worth. As soon as the bank’s liabilities are insufficient to cover their liabilities the 
bank’s depositors will start to liquidate their deposits and the bank goes bankrupt. Analogously to 
second generation models of currency crises Diamond and Dybvig (1983) showed that bank runs 
can be the result of a sudden shift in expectations thereby causing the economy to change from a 
“good” equilibrium of a stable banking system to a “bad” one of a bank run. In this model banks 
act to improve the allocation of investments. Investors are assumed to be subject to a random 
preference shock that might cause them to costly liquidate their long-term investments before the 
referring projects are completed. By pooling the risks resulting from preference shocks via banks 
the allocation of capital can be improved. While storing the share of total deposits that is 
rationally expected to be early withdrawn due to preference shocks the remaining deposits can be 
invested into the long term project. As long as the depositors expect the bank to be safe the 
“good” equilibrium applies and no bank run occurs. But whenever the depositors expect the bank 
to be unsafe a “bad” equilibrium might occur in which all depositors try to withdraw their 
investments early thereby forcing the bank to liquidate all long-term investments, the liquidation 
value of which is below the total sum of deposits and thereby causes the bank to go bankrupt. 
                                                 
11 Compare e.g. Dooley (1997), Krugman (1998), Chang and Velasco (1998), Sachs and Radelet (1998), Buch and 
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The two major types of third generation models of currency crises basically build up on these two 
types of models of banking crises. While the so called “moral hazard models” draw on the idea of 
a policy inconsistency developed in first generation models, “random withdrawal models” build 
up on some open economy version of the Diamond-Dybvig-model. 
 
2.3.1 Moral hazard 
In the first strand of third generation models moral hazard plays an important role.
12 It has long 
been known that governmental guarantees for financial intermediaries’ liabilities might cause 
serious moral hazard problems (compare e.g. Freixas and Rochet (1999), pp. 267-268). Such 
intermediaries have a strong incentive to pursue highly risky investment strategies. Within a class 
of investments with the same net present value and one good and one bad outcome a protected 
intermediary will choose the one with the lowest probability of success. More generally 
guaranteed intermediaries will prefer investments with “fat right tails” (Krugman  (1998), p. 4) 
thereby neglecting that the expected return of these investments might be low or even negative. 
This behaviour is due to the fact that, whenever a bad outcome of the investment project is 
realized, the losses are “nationalized” while the profits under the good outcome are going to the 
owners of the intermediary. The reason why the intermediaries can pursue these risky strategies is 
that the depositors of the financial intermediaries carry no interest in monitoring their deposit 
institutions since they are protected from losses by the government’s guarantees. Thus, whenever 
the government wants to stick to its politics of guaranteeing financial intermediaries’ liabilities it 
should choose some appropriate system of banking regulation and banking supervision. While 
the moral hazard problem was first introduced into the financial crises debate in the mid of the 
eighties by Diaz Alejandro (1985) the argument found not much attention in the debate for a 
decade.  
One of the first models where moral hazard plays an important role is the one by Dooley (1997). 
In his model governments on the one hand are interested in holding reserve assets (for example in 
order to self insure against shocks to national consumption), on the other hand the government is 
interested in protecting the domestic financial sector via acting as a lender of last resort (which 
                                                 
12 Compare McKinnon and Pill (1996), Dooley (1997), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) and Krugman (1998). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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demands for holding reserve assets, too). Dooley (1997) assumes that governments are credit-
constrained, i.e. they can not borrow money on international capital markets without providing 
collateral in the form of reserve assets (like foreign exchange or lines of credit from other 
governments or international organizations). In such a situation a country can not credibly 
promise liquidity insurance to the domestic banking sector if the country’s net assets are not 
positive (net assets equal gross assets minus noncontingent liabilities).  
Dooley (1997) illustrates his model at the example of a country with initially negative or zero net 
reserves. He argues that a macroeconomic shock like a decrease of international interest rates 
might substantially increase the country’s reserve holdings by reducing the value of 
noncontingent government liabilities. This enables the country to credibly insure the banking 
sector’s liabilities. As it was already pointed out in the beginning of this section, this will induce 
moral hazard behaviour on the part of domestic banks. Whenever there is no well working system 
of banking supervision the banks have a strong incentive to seek new deposits by promising 
above-market yields to the investors. Even if the investors know that the domestic banks will not 
be able to pay back their full investments they are willing to invest into the country since they 
expect to be compensated via the government’s reserve assets. The situation is stable as long as 
the government’s net reserves are positive. The problem is that net reserves decline in the course 
of time since banks will have to ask the government for liquidity assistance to be able to fulfil 
their deposit liabilities. As soon as the net reserves are zero all profits from realizing the 
government’s insurance option are realized and the investors start to draw back their money from 
the country. This is due to the fact that they know that the domestic banks cannot stick to their 
promises to pay above market yields because the insurance option is not credible anymore. Thus 
the attack on the government’s reserves itself is generated by competition to avoid losses. 
Different from the earlier presented models Dooley (1997) shows that an attack on a country’s 
reserves can also happen as the result of the promise to provide liquidity assistance and without 
the country’s attempt to fix the exchange rate. Nevertheless it is obvious that a country which is 
running out of reserves will not be able to credibly commit to a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Similar to Dooley (1997), Krugman (1998) argues that the collapse of a fixed exchange rate 
regime might occur as the result of moral hazard due to governmental guarantees to the financial 
sector without an adequate system of banking regulation and supervision. Krugman (1998) 
assumes a stochastic production function with decreasing returns to scale with respect to invested William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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capital. Whenever the government decides t o guarantee liquidity insurance in such an 
environment it is profitable for the intermediaries to invest into the risky investment as long as 
the return on capital equals the world safe rate of interest in the case of the most favourable 
outcome of the project. Thus, when deciding on investments, intermediaries take into account the 
so-called “Pangloss values” (Krugman (1998), p. 6), thereby increasing the capital stock to an 
inefficiently high level and causing the governmental stock of reserves to decrease via honouring 
the bank’s losses from the overly optimistic investments. Different from Dooley (1997) and the 
first generation models of currency crises, Krugman (1998) supposes the crisis not to be triggered 
by an exhausted stock of reserves but by the market participant’s expectation that the government 
will not stick to its promise to bail out private banks in the case of bankruptcy. Thus Krugman 
(1998) ends up with a story that is somewhat similar to second generation models of multiple 
equilibria.  
 
2.3.2 Random withdrawals 
A second strand of the literature (compare Chang and Velasco (1998) or Radelet and Sachs 
(1998)) on third generation crises relies on an open economy version of the random withdrawal 
model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).  
Chang and Velasco (1998) embed the basic Diamond-Dybvig-framework into a three period 
macroeconomic model of a small open economy. In period 0 each resident is born with a certain 
endowment and has access to a constant returns long term technology yielding a return of r<1 
when it is liquidated in period 1 and r>1 otherwise. Thus, liquidating the investment in period 1 is 
costly. In addition to that residents can invest their money in period 0 in the world capital market 
yielding r=1 in either period 1 or period 2. While there are no restrictions for the residents to 
invest into the world capital market, there is an exogenous credit ceiling for each agent. As in the 
Diamond-Dybvig-model residents discover their consumption needs not before period 1. When 
an agent turns out to be of the “impatient” type (which is his private information) he derives 
utility only from consumption in period 1. If he initially knew to be of the impatient type he 
obviously would have preferred an investment into the world capital market. Whenever he 
invested into the long term investment he would liquidate this investments in period 1 to realize 
the highest possible consumption in this period. If an agent turns out be “patient”  he prefers William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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consumption in period 2. Thus patient agents are clearly better off when investing into the long 
term investment. Since agents initially do not know their true type they face a non-trivial 
optimisation problem. In the absence of commercial banks all agents are forced to bear the risk 
from discovering an unexpected type in period 1.  
Again as in the Diamond-Dybvig-model the situation can be enhanced when the agents’ 
endowments are pooled by commercial banks. Commercial banks collect the endowments of the 
residents as deposits and get the possibility to borrow from abroad up to the aggregate credit 
ceiling. In exchange the depositors have the right to withdraw money either in period 1 or in 
period 2, given that the bank is not bankrupt. Chang and Velasco (1998, p. 11) also assume that 
banks are commited to repay any foreign debt under all circumstances. The law of large numbers 
enables commercial banks to determine the optimal amount of investment into the long term 
technology. Because the return of the domestic technology is higher than the world rate of 
interest the investment into the long term technology increases with larger credit ceilings. Since 
there is no aggregate uncertainty about the agents’ types the bank is not forced to liquidate long 
term investments leaving all agents better off. Thus commercial banks improve the allocation that 
could be reached by the agents in isolation. 
The problem with this first best solution is that it might be hard to be implemented when there is 
a sequential service constraint which requires that commercial banks act on a first come-first 
served basis. In period 1 bank’s depositors can be assumed to arrive in random order and may 
decide to withdraw their deposits from the bank or not – given that the bank is still open. 
Whenever a depositor decides to withdraw his funds the bank first tries to borrow the necessary 
funds from abroad (and is successful herein as long as the credit ceiling is not reached) and then 
starts costly liquidating the long term investments into the illiquid technology. The bank has to 
close as soon as the withdrawals exceed the bank’s total liquidation value in period 1. If the bank 
survives until period 2 it liquidates all investments, pays back its foreign credits and then honours 
those agents which not withdrew their deposits in period 1. In this setting a bank run can occur 
(or, more precise, can be an equilibrium phenomenon) when the bank holds less internationally 
liquid assets than its implicit liabilities, i.e. the bank’s potential short term obligations exceed its 
liquidation value in period 1. In this case even patient agents might have an incentive to withdraw 
their funds from the bank in period 1. They will do so whenever they expect that all other patient 
agents will withdraw their deposits, too. They can do so because the bank is not able to observe William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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the true type of an agent, i.e. the true type of an agent is private information to the agent. Beside 
this “bad” equilibrium bank run there is also an equilibrium in which all depositors act in 
accordance to their type, i.e. withdraw early only in the case that they turn out to be impatient in 
period 1. Thus, similar as in second generation models, we deal with multiple equilibria. A 
sudden shift in depositors’ expectations might trigger a banking crisis when the financial system 
is illiquid. 
Chang and Velasco (1998, p. 14) show that a bank run can also be triggered by a panic of foreign 
investors. To be able to serve the withdrawals in period 1 commercial banks rely on foreign 
credits. But foreign creditors will only be willing to lend in period 1 when they expect the bank to 
pay back their liabilities in period 2. As long as the above assumption that foreign credits are 
repaid in any case holds true foreign creditors have no incentive not to lend in period 1. But what 
if foreign creditors can not be sure to be repaid if the bank gets bankrupt? Chang and Velasco 
(1998, p. 15) show that creditors may stop lending in period 1 if they all expect that a bank run 
might occur thereby increasing the probability that, in fact, a bank run takes place. Thus, bank 
runs can be either caused by domestic depositors or foreign creditors.  Another interesting 
implication of the Chang-Velasco-model is that it is not the total volume of foreign capital 
invested into the small country that makes the country vulnerable to banking crises but the 
volume of short term foreign debt (i.e. credits that  must not be rolled over from period 1 to 
period 2).  
Up to this point the Chang-Velasco-model is only a model explaining under which circumstances 
bank runs might occur. But there is only a short way to go to show how the story can be linked to 
currency crises. Therefore Chang and Velasco (1998 p. 35) assume that residents can consume 
only when exchanging domestic currency against foreign currency at the central bank. As long as 
the domestic central bank decides to work as a currency board (i.e. exchanges domestic currency 
against foreign currency at a fixed rate of exchange) and especially does not extend credit to 
domestic banks, there will be no currency crisis regardless of a banking crisis occurs or not. But 
the situation is obviously different when the central bank decides to act as a lender of last resort 
for the domestic banking system in the case of a bank run while trying to fix the exchange rate 
against the foreign currency. The conditions under which a financial crisis occurs (i.e. either a 
banking crisis or a currency crisis) are exactly the same as without the central bank. The decisive 
point is now which of the two goals the central bank prefers: saving domestic banks or fixing the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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exchange rate. When the central bank decides to fix the exchange rate a banking crisis will occur 
and when saving domestic banks by increasing the volume of domestic currency a currency crisis 
will occur. Thus, an important implication of the Chang-Velasco-model is that banking and 
currency crises should not occur together. 
 
2.4 Fourth generation models 
Recently, Krugman (1999a) stated to be somewhat doubtful whether the Asian Crisis is 
adequately described by third generation models, including h is own moral hazard model of 
financial crisis (compare Krugman (1998)). One major point of Krugman’s (1999a) criticism is 
that the real aspects of the economy were widely neglected. Thus these models are incapable to 
explain phenomenons like the observed r eversals in the current accounts the Asian countries 
experienced. In addition to that Krugman (1999a, p. 36) claims that the development of firm’s 
balance sheets has been neglected in the theoretical discussion while being a point of major 
interest in practical discussions. 
To overcome these criticisms Krugman (1999a) proposes a multiple equilibria model in which 
domestic firms take on foreign-currency-denominated debt to finance domestic investment 
projects. A loss of confidence in the domestic industry may lead to a transfer problem, i.e. the 
necessary reversal of the current account can only be realized by a large real depreciation of the 
domestic currency. This real depreciation itself worsens domestic firms’ balance sheets thereby 
validation ex post the loss in confidence. Thus, Krugman’s (1999a) model is different from the 
earlier in this paper reviewed third generation models since a deep financial crisis can occur even 
if there are no problems in the banking sector.
13 
3 The process of transformation in Bulgaria from 1990 to 1996 
3.1  The initial conditions and the logic of disequilibria accumulation 
In the beginning of the process of transition, the most important and specific Bulgarian 
drawbacks were two. On the one hand there was Bulgaria’s huge external debt (about 12 billions 
                                                 
13 Actually Krugman’s (1999a) model is much closer to second generation than to third generation frameworks. 
Recently, Chang and Velasco (2001) also presented a model of monetary policy with balance sheet vulnerability.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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UDS in the end of 1990).
14 On the other hand there was a considerable dependence of the 
Bulgarian external trade mainly by the markets in USSR (in the late 80’s Bulgarian trade with 
USSR represented around 50 percent of all trade flows; compare Dobrinsky (2000)), imposed by 
the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). The government interfered all spheres of 
the Bulgarian economy and in spite of some elements of decentralization, the transition from a 
centrally planned to a m arket economy was considerably harder than in the rest of the east 
European countries. 
Price liberalization began in February 1991 and at the end of the year inflation reached 474 
percent. This surge in prices was first of all due to the necessity of overcoming the artificially 
suppressed inflation and the so-called monetary overhang. But subsequently, during the period of 
1992 to 1996, administrative control of prices again increased (especially with respect to food 
and essential commodities), resulting in market distortions (OECD (1999)).
15 
The breakdown of the CEMA markets and the large and ongoing losses of the state-owned 
enterprises were not compensated by the newly set up private business. The negative balances of 
the state-owned enterprises and banks were transferred to the budget, which consequently led to 
(i) high budget deficits, (ii) increasing internal debt and (iii) monetization of these losses by the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). As a result all losses were born by households and de novo 
created private firms, which worked according to market economy principles. 
The process of privatization in Bulgaria was delayed. Land restitution, launched in 1991, worked 
very slowly and in late 1996 only 18 percent of land properties were restored to their owners. In 
1992, when the Law on Privatization passed and the Privatization Agency was established, the 
share of the private sector in GDP was only 20 percent (agriculture not included). During the 
period of 1991 to 1997 only 20 percent of state assets were privatized (OECD (1999)).
16 Small-
scale privatization proceeded, particularly in trade, food processing and tourism but no progress 
                                                 
14 In a five-year period of 1984 to 1989, Bulgarian external debt increased by 7.8 billion USD (compare Dobrinsky 
(2000)). 
15 The energy and most of the services prices were also held below international standard levels (Minassian and 
Nenovsky (1998)). 
16 According to the results of an IMF study the total index of the Bulgarian economy restructuring during 1989 to 
1994 is considerably below that of advanced CEECs. The total indices for Hungary (2.6) and for Poland (2.4) where 
clearly above the one for Bulgaria, which was only 1.4. In the next period (1995 to 1997) the total index for Bulgaria 
grew to 4.1 while those for Hungary and Poland were 6.5 and 6.2, respectively (Fisher and Sahay (2000)). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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was made in privatizing large enterprises in heavy industry and manufacturing. The loss-making 
state-owned enterprises (see table 1) were subsidized by the banking system via direct loans from 
BNB, or indirectly by issuing security bonds. The delay of privatization, maintaining inefficient 
productions and transforming the loss into quasi-fiscal liabilities, covered primarily by monetary 
expansion, was in the interest of public sector interest groups as well as of political authorities.
17 
Though a full range of privatization methods was put into practice, the processes of 
denationalization and of creating efficient markets were lagging behind.  
 
Table 1: Financials results at the state owned firms (1992-1997) 
(as a percentage of balance sheet’s assets) 
  Net profit 
Year  Industry  Construction  Transport  Trade  Others 
1992  -7.87  0.26  0.08  -1.62  0.00 
1993  -12.74  -2.17  -6.99  -1.14  -4.96 
1994  -4.89  -2.14  -3.28  0.43  5.37 
1995  -4.24  -1.14  -5.23  -1.31  1.10 
1996  -5.54  -1.18  -5.85  -1.78  -6.71 
1997  2.89  0.99  3.43  2.30  2.50 
Source: OECD (1999, p.79). 
In 1997, employment had decreased to 72 percent of its level in 1989. During this period 
registered unemployment was in between 12 and 16 percent of the labour force. There were 
clear-cut regional discrepancies
18 between the capital Sofia and rest of the towns on the one hand, 
and between big towns and small towns and rural areas on the other hand. Both can be viewed as 
a consequence of the pre-1989 structure when small or middle towns depended on one or two 
industries.  
                                                 
17 See Koford (2000) for a detailed survey of the Bulgarian process of transition. He uses Mancur Olson’s theoretical 
approach, which presents politicians and bureaucrats as different types of bandits (compare also Frye and Shleifer 
(1996)).  
18 A detailed analysis of regional discrepancies is made in the Human Development Report by UNDP (2000) which 
presents for the first time the municipality index of human development with very low values in most of the regions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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Consequently, GDP continuously went down to 66.5 percent (1997) of its level in 1989, with the 
most severe drop in the period of 1995 to 97 (-17.1 percentage points – National Statistical 
Institute (1999)).
19 Investments slumped and in 1997 they were on a level of only 13.9 percent of 
GDP, which was only 55 percent of the level in 1991. Households consumption had been 
decreasing throughout, whereas saving decreased from 60.3 percent of GDP in 1990 to 19.2 
percent in 1997. The government was impeded by tax base contraction and low tax collection 
(tax revenues in percent of GDP declined from 50 percent of GDP in 1989 to 26.5 percent in 
1996). In late 1996 internal and external debt reached alarming levels (60 percent respectively 
243 percent of GDP; compare also table 2).  
When analyzing the Bulgarian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997 it is important to have a close look 
at the process of profit- and loss-, asset- and liability-transfers from another perspective. There 
was a struggle among different groups of economic agents for deriving self-favors from the 
transition process and even for manipulating it (see Koford (1999) and Nenovsky and Rizopoulos 
(2002)). This struggle for economic power was incorporated into the political process of the 
country, resulting in a period of political instability (during the studied period as many as 7 
cabinets were assigned). 
Table 2: Dynamics of government and government guaranteed debt (1991-2000) 
Year  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Dom. debt/GDP  13%  19%  37%  52%  39%  60%  16%  14%  14%  7% 
For. debt/GDP  168%  127%  109%  129%  73%  243%
*  91%  72%  78%  72% 
Source: BNB, Fiscal Services. 
* Lev devaluation should be taken into account 
Altogether, the period from 1990 to 1996 can be seen as a period of accumulation of huge 
microdisproportions resulting in macrodisequilibria and ending up in the 1996/1997 crisis. The 
occurring local and temporary crises during 1994 and late 1995 were overcome by general 
stabilizing IMF programs, although almost none of them was finalized (Yotzov (2001)). 
    
                                                 
19 At the end of 1996 the GDP of Bulgaria was 25% of the average one in OECD countries while for example the 
GDP of Czech Republic was 64%, of - Hungary 47%, and of Poland – 35% of the average level in OECD. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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3.2  Development of the banking system 
At the end of 1989 large-scale restructuring of the Bulgarian financial and banking system 
began
20, reflecting  the need to shift to a modern two-tier banking system typical of a market 
economy. The sector-specific banks were transformed into classical commercial banks, accepting 
deposits from individuals. These banks were separate legal entities, making loans to households 
and all sectors of the economy. The existing 59 branches of the BNB were transformed into 
autonomous commercial banks. The Post Bank was recreated. By early 1991 the banking system 
comprised the BNB, the State Saving B ank (SSB) and 69 commercial banks organized as 
autonomous joint stock companies (compare table 3 for empirical data on the development of 
Bulgaria’s banking sector). With the adoption of the Law on the BNB in June 1991 the roles, 
objectives and functions of the BNB and the commercial banks were redefined. The new Law 
formally granted the BNB independence from the government and set objectives and functions 
typical of those of modern central banks. 
Table 3: Development of the Banking System in Bulgaria 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Number of banks  70  53  56  37  42  44  45*  34  34  35 
Number of privately 
owned banks 
1  3  6  10  18  22  23  28  29  29 
Foreign Banks  0  0  0  0  2  4  7  9  10  19 
Market share (assets)  
of largest banks 
(number of banks in 
parenthesis) 
n.a  77.8%   
(6) 
74.8%  
(8) 
81.6%  
(13) 
78.5%  
(13) 
74.9% 
(7) 
67%  
(7) 
75.4% 
(7) 
70.4% 
(7) 
70.2%  
(7) 
Source: BNB Annual Reports 
* Banks in liquidation are included.  
In March 1992 the Law on Banks and Credit Activity was adopted. This law established the 
regulatory framework for the activities of banking institutions. Under this law commercial banks 
were granted either a restricted license or a full license. Banks with a restricted license were 
                                                 
20Parts of this section are inspired from one of our former studies (compare Caporale et al. (2002)). The paper also 
includes a more detailed description of Bulgaria’s banking system before 1990.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
  22 
allowed to operate only within the national boundaries. Banks with a full license were permitted 
to operate both domestically and internationally. 
BNB adopted a liberal licensing policy. By the end of 1992, there were 56 commercial banks. 
The large number of commercial banks and the low capitalization levels of many banks generated 
interest in banking sector consolidation. The first stage of consolidation took place through the 
Bank Consolidation Company (BCC). BCC was founded in 1992 in order to consolidate, 
restructure and privatize state owned commercial banks. While the BCC was not equipped with 
the appropriate staff and financial resources, needed to achieve its ambitious goals, especially in 
the area of privatization, it assisted in the consolidation of several banking groups. The first 
consolidated bank, the United Bulgarian Bank (UBB), was formed at the end of 1992 from the 
merger of 22 smaller banks. The second wave of consolidation took place in 1993. During this 
period Expressbank and Hebrosbank emerged. The last wave of the process of consolidation 
ended in 1995 with the take-over of Sofiabank by Biochim Commercial Bank. BNB also pursued 
a policy of promoting consolidation of private commercial banks by raising minimum capital 
requirements. This policy did not result in the consolidation of private banks as these banks were 
guided by group interests and it was difficult to find common ground for consolidation. 
After the process of consolidation came to an end the Bulgarian banking sector continued to be 
dominated by state-owned banks. During the whole period of 1990 to 1996 commercial banks 
were used by the government to provide implicit subsidies in the form of credits to loss-making 
state-owned enterprises. Bank balance sheets were further weakened as the BNB continued to 
provide additional resources to the commercial banks through refinancing. Private banks also 
expanded their lending to many newly incorporated private companies. Quite often these loans 
violated the regulatory framework, which was designed to maintain bank solvency by restricting 
the size of loans and limit the loans to bank officers. 
Bankers often lacked sufficient training and internal controls on bank loan decisions were weak. 
While banks were required to collateralize their loans, the system did not work well.  Poor 
communication among bankers and inadequate data made it more difficult to identify poor credit 
risks. The courts were also ineffective in convicting borrowers when fraudulent behavior led to 
loan defaults. Thus, the severe banking crisis of 1996 was also a logical outcome of the failure of 
banks to adhere to basic principles of sound commercial banking. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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As a whole, the prevailing part of the banks were included in various “bandit” coalitions with 
people from the government, parties and the business. Their sole goal was quick and single 
enrichment on the account of the public (in Olson’s classification those coalitions are called 
“roving  bandits”; compare  Koford  (2000)). Notions like “ connected  lending,  inside  lending, 
informal lending, inside loan” etc. were common phenomena in Bulgaria at that time (Koford and 
Tschoegl (1999)). 
Furthermore, a policy of restricting the presence of foreign banks had been pursued until 1995.
21 
This policy was due to the notion that domestic banks might be incapable to compete with large 
international banks.  In 1994, five years after the launch of the banking sector reform, two 
branches of foreign banks started operations in Bulgaria (Xios and ING Bank). In 1995 two more 
foreign banks, BNP-Dresdner Bank and Ionian Bank opened up. An OECD (1999) analysis 
points out  that  “[u]ntil 1996, commercial credit was expanded to the non-financial sector in 
Bulgaria to a degree that was unprecedented relative to any other European transition economy”. 
It should be added that the structure of this credit was not “healthy” and led to the accumulation 
of a large amount of bad loans (see table 2). With respect to bad loans one and the same cycle 
was repeated several times (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996): when they grew up to a large amount 
or when “somebody benefitted from that”, the state “took over” them through transferring 
government securities denominated in BGN or USD to the banks (compare Vutcheva (2000)). In 
March 1996, in a desperate attempt to recapitalize several state-owned commercial banks, a new 
operation was launched. The Ministry of Finance paid Bulbank USD 200 million for ZUNK 
bonds with a face value of USD 400 million. The securities were then distributed by the BCC as 
capital contributions to the banks under BCC control. In 1997, immediately before the 
introduction of the currency board, the government launched a new operation for the 
recapitalization of Biochim CB. The operation involved the buyback from Biochim CB of ZUNK 
bonds (which were sold at a price considerably below their face value) with a face value of USD 
50 million. The government then issued 18-month government securities, which were purchased 
by Bulbank.  
 
                                                 
21 Nevertheless some Bulgarian commercial bankers complainted accused foreign banks to have the privilege not to 
have reserve obligations at the central bank. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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3.3  The central bank: Lender of first resort  
The next level of the pyramid of soft budget constraints was the central bank. BNB played the 
major role in the mechanism of disequilibria accumulation.
22 As we have already pointed above, 
BNB became the place where finally the losses of the real sector, budget and the banking system 
were concentrated.  
Despite its  de  jure independence, the central bank was  de  facto totally dependent on the 
government
23 and on different partisan and corporate interests. Actually there was  de  jure 
dependence on the fisk because the Law of the Budget is superior to the Law of BNB. The 
practice showed that this juridical subordination was used for the Ministry of Finance to get the 
necessary loans. One major example was the direct loan from BNB to the Ministry of Finance at 
the end of 1996 (with a volume of 7 percent of GDP) which was imposed to BNB by changing 
the Law of the Budget by the parliament. BNB’s behavior did not create any restrictions in 
refinancing the commercial banks and crediting the Ministry of Finance (MF). BNB rather 
stimulated the latter to take more money in various forms. 
In the period of 1991 to 1996 BNB had virtually no control over the sources of reserve money 
and respectively on the money supply (Nenovsky (1998)).
24 There were two sources responsible 
of money supply shocks:  refinancing operations by commercial banks and budget financing by 
the government. In most of the cases the channels of loss monetization were mixed and it was 
difficult to distingush one from the other. 
Commercial banks (CB) were refinanced on a completely subjective and discretionary basis. The 
various forms of refinancing included: discount refinancing (private securities  collateral), 
lombard refinancing (government securities collateral) and non-collaretal refinancing.
25 It is not 
exaggerated to state that the central bank played the role of a lender of first resort rather than a 
                                                 
22According to the classical analysis by Kornaj (2000) soft budget constraints in Bulgaria in the period of 1990 to 
1996 can be grouped as follows: (i) inherited from the socialism and (ii) specific for the transition process (compare 
the outlook by Maskin and Xu (2001)). 
23 Some authors use the notion of  “central bank fiscal dependence” (Sotirova, 2000). 
24 We do not mention BNB influence on money demand since it was never measured (such notion was not even 
used) and the central bank had no effect on it either through base interest rate changes or through exchange market 
inteventions. 
25 The features of collateral are of particular significance in transition economies. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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lender of last resort. Table 4 shows that the refinancing operations led to a credit portfolio 
including 75 percent doubtful and uncollectible exposures in the end of 1995. The losses of the 
banking system were enormous. On 30.06.1994 for example, as many as 35 banks out of 44 were 
producing losses (Vutcheva (2001)). In between 1990 and 1996 several  bancrupt state-owned 
banks (for instance Agrobiznesbank, TB Yambol) were bought by BNB for the symbolic price of 
1 lev. 
Table 4. Dynamics of uncollectible credits (in % of total credit) (1993-2000) 
  1993  1994  1995  1996* 
Standard exposures  7.61  17.69  25.91  43.67 
Doubtful exposures (group A)  82.75  66.88  54.55  33.89 
Doubtful exposures (group B)  2.19  3.46  4.18  10.67 
Uncollectible exposures  7.45  11.97  15.35  11.77 
Reported / required statutory 
provisions 
7.18  23.58  23.84  105.42 
 
  1997*  1998*  1999*  2000* 
Standard exposures  58.24  69.02  73.26  82.62 
Watch exposures  8.59  10.05  9.29  6.47 
Substandard exposures  5.86  5.60  2.17  2.99 
Doubtful exposures  4.66  1.68  3.25  2.03 
Loss  22.65  13.65  12.04  5.89 
Source: BNB, Banking Supervision Department 
*Banks in liquidations are excluded. Since 1997 (CB introduction) a new classification of loans was adopted. 
The Ministry of Finance (MF) regularly took financing from BNB in one form or another. Apart 
from the direct loans and of government securities sales to the central bank, in fact the budget 
deficit was financed via a third indirect channel –  sales of government securities to commercial 
banks. The mechanism consisted of several phases.  First, the commercial banks bought 
government securities (or obtain them in the above mentioned “rescue operations”). Those 
securities were used by commercial banks to provide collateral for lombard loans from BNB. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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Ministry of Finance paid back its credit to BNB with the money provided by the commercial 
banks (as a counterpart for government securities). When commercial banks could not buy 
additional government securities the budget was forced again to sell securities to the central bank 
or take another direct way of financing. In general  commercial banks were used for transferring 
government liabilities to BNB or to the households (for further details compare Nenovsky 
(1998)). 
Moral hazard behavior was intensified by the deposit insurance scheme introduced in the end of 
1995 (Nenovsky and Petrov (2001)). Although the public may have implicitly believed that there 
already was some form of deposit insurance, there was no formal insurance arrangement during 
the early 1990s. At the end of 1995 the Managing Board of BNB adopted a regulation for banks 
to contribute to an insurance fund managed by BNB. In May 1996, when the first commercial 
banks were closed, the resources of this insurance fund proved to be insufficient.  A law 
protecting deposits at insolvent commercial banks was quickly passed in May 1996. Although the 
government budget situation did not allow for a further increase in domestic debt, the law was 
passed to avoid public discontent.  The new law covered 100 percent of deposit losses of 
individuals and 50 percent of deposit losses of legal entities. Under this law the Ministry of 
Finance issued government securities (denominated in BGN and USD) and entered them into the 
balance sheet of chosen solvent banks, which should take over the commitment to repay the 
deposits of failed banks. 
The central bank was not all the time aware of the f undamental loss of control over money 
supply. Officially the Managing Board of BNB stated from time to time to follow a monetary 
regime of reserve money targeting since 1994.
26 In fact the base intereste rate was raised several 
times (in most of the cases inappropriately; in September 1996 the base interest rate reached 300 
percent) and several currency sales were executed. However, in none of the cases such actions 
attained the intended results. That policy did not recover money demand for BGN but just left the 
country with exhausted foreign currency reserves (which decreased to 500 million USD in the 
end of 1996, i.e. the value of two months’ imports). 
                                                 
26 Immediately the question occurs how this dynamics was acquired under permanent IMF expertise  (for an opinion 
on this aspect compare Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2002)).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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4. The Bulgarian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997 
4.1 The dynamics of the crisis 
Due to the fact that the Bulgarian Financial Crisis of 1996/1997 evolved gradually it is somewhat 
difficult to define the crisis period exactly. The core crisis period was considerably short: it 
started in May 1996 and ended in February 1997
27. We suggest May 1996 to be the beginning of 
the Bulgarian Financial Crisis since it was at that time when the court proceedings for closing 
several commercial banks began. The end of February 1997 is the end of the crisis since at that 
time the exchange rate stabilized (even if the currency board arrangement formally started not 
before July 1997). In March 1997 the inflation rate dropped drastically and economic agents 
started to take the introduction of a currency board system into account. 
Chronologically, the first wave of the crisis came from the banking system when in the end of 
May 1996 BNB took 5 commercial banks, 3 of which were private, under conservatorship
 28 The 
attack on the banks was triggered by depositors’ expectations that their foreign deposits would be 
confiscated or frozen by the government in order to allow it to meet its interest payments on the 
external debt due in July (there were several indications that the government could do so). The 
fact that Bulgaria had no agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1996 
reinforced this fear. The deposits from the bankrupt banks were transferred to the sound ones and 
at the same time a Law for Bank Deposit Guarantee passed the Parliament. According to this law 
the government had to repay the full amounts of individuals’ deposits with bankrupt banks and 
50 percent of enterprises’ deposits (BNB (1996)). At first, individuals were allowed to draw their 
deposits in BGN before the court declared its decision on closed banks (withdrawals of foreign 
currency deposits were in portions). The money withdrawn was quickly directed to the foreign 
currency market where BGN got under pressure. Later on, this permission was abolished and 
BGN deposits were also blocked. Altogether, throughout 1996 depositors lost more than 50 
                                                 
27 Sgard (1999) supposes the crisis period to start in the beginning of December 1996 and to end in February 1997. 
The crisis chronology can be found only in a few publications; it is broadly covered by BNB annual reports (1996, 
1997), BNB Discussion papers (Balyozov (1999)), and partially by Sgard (1999), Nenovsky (1999), Dobrinsky 
(2000), Vutcheva (2001) and Sotirova (2001). 
28 Private Agricultural and Investment Bank, Mineralbank, First Private Bank and Agrobusinessbank.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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percent of their savings. It is interesting to note that 90 percent of the uncollateralized refinancing 
in the time before the crisis was concentrated in the bankrupt banks. One of the most common 
reasons that these banks got such a high degree of uncollateralized loans was these banks were of 
systematic importance to the integrity of the payments system (BNB (1996)).
29 
 
 
Figure 1: Refinancing to commercial banks (1991 – 1997) 
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Figure 2: Domestic credit dynamics (1996 – 1997) 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Jan
96
Mar
96
May
96
Jul
96
Sep
96
Nov
96
Jan
97
Mar
97
May
97
Jul
97
Sep
97
Nov
97
m
l
n
.
 
B
G
N
     Claims on government sector (net) Claims on non-government sector 
 
Source: BNB, own calculations 
                                                 
29 According to Balyozov (1999) during the whole period of 1995 to 1996 two big state-owned banks regularly 
obtained refinancing in order to prevent shocks to the payments system. Concerning the role of the payment system 
in financial crises compare De Band and Hartmann (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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Figure 3. Base interest rate (1996 – 1997) 
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Table 5: Annual interest rate spread and deposits rates (1992-2000) 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Interest Rate Spread  18.3  26.3  37.5  36.1  153.8  129.0  11.1  10.3  9.2 
Deposit Interest rate  55.8  52.0  65.1  43.7  146.4  80.8  3.0  3.3  3.0 
Spread/Deposit rate  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.8  1.1  1.6  3.7  3.1  3.1 
Source: BNB, Miller and Petranov (2001) 
At the same time as BNB took the earlier mentioned 5 commercial banks under conservatorship, 
BNB started raising the base interest rate. In May 1996 the base interest rate was 108 percent 
(simple annual); in September 1996 it rose to 300 percent, while it decreased twice in October 
1996 and reached 240 percent and 180 percent, respectively. At the end of September 1996 
another 9 commercial banks were declared to be insolvent.
30 The increase of the base interest rate 
was partially caused by the BNB’s active open market operations (primarily reverse repurchase 
agreements - repos) in order to withdraw liquidity (Balyozov (1999)). The rise in interest rates 
caused an avalanche-like increase in the  internal debt and suspicions of default arose
31. 
                                                 
30 Commercial and Savings Bank, Balkanbank, Economic Bank, Businessbank, Elitebank, CB Slaviani, CB Mollow, 
Dobrich CB and Yambol CB. 
31 A similar dynamics was observed during the Russian crisis in 1998 when the government de facto defaulted on the 
internal debt (moratorium on GKOs in August). For a detailed analysis compare Chapman and Mulino (2001). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
  30 
Immediately before the crisis, BNB and DSK (State Saving Bank) were the main players in the 
interbank market. During the crisis, over 50 percent of the interbank market turnover were frozen 
in the bankrupt banks. In the third quarter of 1996 DSK (the bank with the biggest deposit base) 
was forced to redirect its resources to agricultural loans. BNB began to change the minimum 
reserve requirements in opposite directions. First, it lowered them from 9.5 percent to 8.5 percent 
and later it began raising them up to a level of 11 percent in December 1996. Throughout this 
period the bank supervision authorities were powerless, moreover, there were no efficient court 
proceedings to prove commercial banks’ bankruptcies quickly. 
Altogether, 14 commercial banks (out of 46) were closed in 1996, which represented 24 percent 
of the banking system’s assets. In the same year the population withdrew 42 percent of its foreign 
currency deposits and 21 percent of the deposits in BGN, equaling almost 70 percent of 
Bulgaria’s foreign currency reserves
32. 
In parallel with the restrictive policy with regard to commercial banks, BNB began to grant direct 
loans to the Ministry of Finance in order to ensure the huge internal debt servicing resulting from 
the high interest rate levels. At the end of 1996 the central bank gave several loans to the Ministry 
of Finance (under a parliament decision) one of which had a volume of 7 percent of GDP. This 
asymmetry of monetary policy (restrictive to banks and expansionary to the budget) made it 
ineffective and even more dangerous. 
While the first impulse came from the banking system, the banking crisis quickly induced a 
currency crisis
33. The devaluation of BGN was accompanied by a dramatic foreign currency 
reserve decrease (in the beginning of 1996 it was 1236.4 mil. USD and at end of the year - 483.4 
mil. USD) and by a short period of hyperinflation. In 1996 the BGN was depreciated by 590 
percent. As a whole, the most harsh devaluation of BGN and the highest rates of inflation were 
scored in the first two months of 1997 (see figures 4 and 5). The monthly chain CPI reached 
values of 44 percent in January and 243 percent in February and annual inflation for 1997 was 
                                                 
32 During the russian crisis (from October 1997 to October 1998) Russia’s central bank lost about half of its foreign 
reserves. 
33 Basically this sequential structure fits well to the Chang and Velasco model (1998) when the central bank prefers 
to defend the fixed exchange rate instead of taking care on the banking system. Therefore the banking crisis occurs 
first. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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578 percent (BNB (1997)).
34 This hyperinflation was accompanied by the classic separation of 
the two money functions as a unit of account and a medium of exchange. The first function was 
performed by the US Dollar which were used to fix the prices while the Bulgarian lev carried out 
the second one by serving as medium of exchange
35 (although a lot of trade was orientated to the 
US Dollar or the Deutsche Mark). 
                                                 
34There was a sudden drop in inflation in March when the monthly CPI was 12.3 percent and in April the economy 
experienced deflation (– 0.7 percent). For the second half of 1997, after the establishment of the currency board 
arrangements, accumulated inflation was 16.2 percent which was quite lower in comparison with inflation in the first 
half of 1997 (484.2 percent). 
35 A similar separation was observed during the crisis in Russia 1998. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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Figure 4: Monthly change in consumer prices on previous month during 1997 
Source: BNB, own calculations 
 
Figure 5: Exchange rate dynamics during 1997 
Source: BNB, own calculations  
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Source: BNB. 
The general behavior of the population during the crisis period can be depicted by the dynamics 
of the money-in-circulation/deposits ratio, which steeply dropped.
36 Since Bulgaria (in contrast to 
other countries in transition) was c haracterised by a considerably high  level of bank 
intermediation, the costs of the 1996/1997 financial crisis, which included a severe banking 
crisis, were very high (26 percent of GDP for the period of 1991 to 1998; compare Zoli (2001)).
37  
The financial crisis was accompanied by a deep political crisis and mass  demonstrations. The 
social turmoil culminated on 10 January 1997 when the Parliament was attacked. On 4 February 
1997 the major political parties took a principle decision to introduce the CB arrangements.
38 The 
new President took office on 20 January 1997, the socialist party abdicated from power, a 
caretaker government was appointed and new parliamentary elections were held on 19 April 
1997. Under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund (in April 1997 another agreement 
with the IMF was reached) in the course of time economic agents started to adjust their behavior 
to the forthcoming establishment of the currency board in July 1997. De facto BNB started to 
work as a currency board as early as in March 1997.  
 
4.2 Towards a theoretical classification of the  
Bulgarian Financial Crisis 
After having described the crisis the question arises, how to classify the Bulgarian Financial 
Crisis with respect to the theoretical models reviewed in section 2.
39 This  task is not easily to 
solve because of the intertwining features of the theoretical models. Nevertheless, we suppose the 
1996/1997 Bulgarian crisis to be a good example for third generation moral hazard twin crises in 
                                                 
36 The “bank reserves/deposits” ratio dramatically decreased, indicating the liquidity shrinkage in the bank system. 
As a whole this resulted in an increase in the money multiplier.  
37 Many empirical studies show that the higher the share of banking intermediation in the whole financial system is, 
the higher the costs of a banking crisis are (Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2001)). 
38 At some point all political forces competed with each other for IMF liking and to be the ones to introduce the CB 
arrangement. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect see Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2002). 
39 The complexity of the Bulgarian crisis has never been subject to special analyses. In their review of the banking 
crises in transition economies Tang, Zoli and Klytchnikova (2000) point out that Bulgaria is the only transition 
country where a banking crisis was combined with a currency crisis. Later on, Chapman and Mulino (2001) stressed 
the “twin crises” elements of Russian crisis.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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the tradition of the Dooley (1997) and Krugman (1998) models. In the following we will discuss 
why we come to this conclusion and which additional features are to be considered. 
Obviously the Bulgarian crisis of 1996/1997 was a twin crisis, i.e. Bulgaria suffered both, a 
banking and a currency crisis.
40 Chronologically, the banking crisis caused the currency crisis 
thereby reinforcing the problems of the banking sector. But this is only a part of a more complex 
story visualized by figure 8. 
Figure 8: Dynamics of the Bulgarian Financial Crisis 
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Before turning to a description of figure 8 we first shall discuss the important role, moral hazard 
played in the Bulgarian Financial Crisis. In the models by Dooley (1997) and Krugman (1998) 
the government induces moral hazard behavior by credibly committing to use the government 
foreign exchange reserves to bail out banks with illiquidity problems. As it was pointed out in 
section 4, the Bulgarian government made such a commitment in July 1996, a few months after 
the banking crisis started and the first 5 commercial banks were closed. The interesting fact is 
that this explicit governmental guarantee did not cause but merely reinforced the banking crisis 
                                                 
40 It should be stated clearly that it is no prerequisite for a currency crisis that a country announced to fix the 
exchange rate against a foreign currency. Our definition of a currency crisis simply requires that there is a heavy 
devaluation of the domestic currency (compare section 2). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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by creating additional moral hazard behavior by commercial banks. In the Bulgarian case, the 
most fundamental cause of the crisis was the existence of some kind of systematic moral hazard. 
It penetrated all economic activities and could be explained by the inherited behavior of being 
fully secured and guaranteed which dates back to the centrally planned economy. We might talk 
of some kind of moral hazard path dependence of economic agents’ behavior.
41 In the previous 
economic system losses were nationalized and socialized either within the country or within 
CEMA. Until the crisis there was no formal law guaranteeing bank deposits, but the population 
expected to be compensated in cases of losses, nevertheless.
42 
Thus, until 1996 in fact all financial companies could rely on an implicit (and later on explicit) 
100 percent guarantee from the government. Actually, a great part of the commercial banks were 
state-owned. State-owned banks’ losses were always quickly nationalized. We may recall that the 
purchases of some bankrupt banks for 1 lev only and rescue operations when the budget took 
over all losses. It is not surprising that Bulgaria is the East European country with the highest 
fiscal  costs of banking crises (about 42% of GDP). The credit expansion before 1996 was 
primarily due to this climate of implicit and explicit governmental guarantees and protections. 
The interest rates on loans (although they were very high at times) did not reflect the true risk of a 
credit. Most of the loans were granted being aware that they would not be paid back and that 
banks would not cover the losses (Koford and Tschoegl (1999)). A whole system to draw money 
from banks and financial institutions was set  up in which representatives of the Ministry of 
Finance, BNB, commercial banks and state and private enterprises participated. A parallel with 
the classical theory of a lending boom by Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) and with the 
disaster myopia model by Guttentag and Herring (1986) might be drawn. 
Let us now turn to a description of figure 8 describing the dynamics of the Bulgarian Financial 
Crisis. The first shock (the beginning of the crisis) was due to the attack on several banks when 
                                                 
41 The same is true with respect to the government which in the past relied on USSR and CEMA in critical situations.  
42  A curious fact is that many financial “ponzi” pyramids (offering unusually high interest rates) collapsed, and 
although the public had been repeatedly warned not to place its money in these “ponzi” pyramids, after their defaults 
people claimed the government to pay back the lost money as it had been the time before. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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the depositors feared that their deposits would be confiscated in order to the government to be 
able to meet its foreign debt obligations in mid 1996 (see table 6).
43  
 
Table 6: Debt indicators for “crisis’ countries (1996-1997) 
Country  Total debt/GDP 
(1996) 
Short-term debt/foreign reserves 
(All countries 1997, Bulgaria 1996) 
Short-term debt/total debt 
(All countries 1997, Bulgaria 1996) 
Indonesia  47%  1.6  24% 
Malaysia  39%  0.6  39% 
Philippines  51%  0.7  19% 
Thailand  50%  1.1  46% 
Korea  21%  3.0  67% 
Average  42%  1.4  39% 
Bulgaria  103%  1.3  11% 
Source: Komulainen (2001, p. 17) and BNB (2000). 
 
This change in expectations and the distrust in the government and BNB were triggered not only 
by the decreasing foreign exchange reserves of the central bank but also by the lack of an 
agreement with the IMF (note that the government at that time was a socialist one). Bulgaria was 
unable to get loans in financial markets because of the lack of foreign currency reserves that 
could be used as collateral. At the same time information about the unhealthy state of several 
banks spread out and the population was worried that these banks might be closed.
44 The 
Bulgarian crisis might also serve as an illustration of an inevitable panic period and micro 
contamination of depositors like in the herding behavior models of Banerjee (1992, 1993).
45 
                                                 
43 The major difference between the Bulgarian and the Russian Crisis is that people in Russia expected that the 
internal debt service would cease (and it de facto ceased temporarily in August 1998). 
44 In the tradition of multiple equilibria models we argue this change in expectations to be the reason why Bulgaria’s 
economy turned from a „good“ to a „bad“ equilibrium. 
45 Compare also Nenovsky (1997).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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Deposit withdrawals turned into panic. In order to stop this panic, the law on bank deposits 
guarantee was passed (100 percent for physical persons and 50 percent for enterprises), but, as 
argued earlier, this actually worsened the situation. Further steps were taken with the same 
purpose: BNB started to pursue a restrictive policy towards banks (after a period of large-scale 
refinancing) via raising interest rates
46 and at once selling US Dollars to protect  the BGN 
exchange rate.
47 The sharp increase in interest rates in the second half of 1997 (suggested by the 
International Monetary Fund
48) intensified the crisis. There was an unexpected change from an 
extremely loose to a very restrictive bank refinancing policy
49. This turnabout in the treatment of 
banks was an additional, considerable shock both to the banks and to the government.
50 The high 
nominal interest rates caused an avalanche-like increase in the internal debt and suspicions about 
the government’s ability to service it arose. The internal debt became a classic example of 
“ponzi” financing where new government securities had to be issued in order to make the interest 
payments on previous issues of government securities. As investors’ interest in these new issues 
was low, BNB was compelled to buy them. In addition to that commercial banks suffered from 
the increased interest rates and a new round of 9 banks became bankrupt, thereby further 
increasing the panic. Facing the threat of a moratorium on the internal debt, BNB began to 
provide extensive monetary financing of the budget deficit (under the pressure by the government 
and the parliament). 
The funds withdrawn from commercial banks and obtained from sales of government were 
quickly converted into USD what led to a dramatic devaluation of BGN, i.e. a currency crisis. 
While BNB was not officially maintaining a fixed exchange rate, it was trying to keep the value 
of BGN by selling foreign currency when BGN started to devalue. Thus, BNB’s foreign currency 
                                                 
46 It should be noted that the decision to rise the base interest rate was suggested by IMF although the negative side-
effects have already been recognized during the former crises in Latin America. 
47 Note that the Dooley (1997) model predicts that such a policy will not be successful in the course of time – what 
proved to be true in the Bulgarian case. 
48 The rise of interest rates in order to preserve the exchange rate was typical for emerging markets regardless of this 
measure was suggested by IMF or not (see Chang and Velasco, 2001). 
49 Compare the model developed by Aharony and al. (1986). 
50 The effects of rising interest rates are a major concern in the models of Bensaid and Jeanne (1996), Obstfeld 
(1996) and Aglietta (1993), as well as one of the leading accusations addressed by Stiglitz (compare Palast (2001)) 
against the IMF templet programs. 
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reserves (like in the model of Dooley (1997)) had two functions – to protect both the exchange 
rate and the banking system against a lack of liquidity. In addition to that and as in first and 
second generation models, BNB had to finance a large part of the budget deficit, i.e. the central 
bank had to juggle among three nominal commitments. 
Apart form the BGN devaluation, inflation expectations soared as well as inflation itself, coming 
to a point where the rising exchange rate and the inflation were catching up with and supporting 
each other. Inflation expectations were influenced by the doubts that the government would use 
inflation to reduce its BGN-denominated internal debt. The BNB balance sheet was absolutely 
altered – the net foreign assets dropped to half a million USD while the domestic credit increased 
a lot. After a period of hyperinflation when the government’s internal debt and the liabilities to 
banks melted away and the population lost almost all savings in BGN, a currency board 
arrangement was p repared and introduced leading to a sharpe decrease in inflation and a 
stabilization of the USD-BGN exchange rate. 
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Table 7: Foreign direct investments (FDI) in Bulgaria (1992-1997) 
  Till the end of 
1992 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Investment projects  69  604  2276  1932  3308  1889 
Accumulated  69  673  2949  4881  8189  10078 
Annual amount (mln. USD)  34.4  102.4  210.9  162.6  256.4  636.2 
Change to preceding year 
    in percent 
…  198  106  -33  57  148 
Annual amount of investments 
through privatization (mln. USD) 
34.4  22  134.2  26  76.4  421.4 
In percent to total FDI  100  22  64  16  30  66 
Change to preceding year  
    in percent 
…  -78  190  -75  88  120 
Accumulated FDI  
(mln. USD) 
34.4  136.8  347.6  510.2  766.6  1402.8 
Index, 1992=100  100  398  101  1483  2228  4078 
Average amount of investments per 
project (thousands USD) 
           
per year  498.6  169.5  92.7  84.2  77.5  336.8 
With accumulation  498.6  203.3  117.9  104.5  93.6  139.2 
Source: Foreign Investments Agency. 
 
A major prerequisite for a moral hazard crisis occurring, underlined (not only) in the Dooley 
(1997) and Krugman (1998) models, is the absence of an efficient system of bank regulation and 
supervision. Bulgaria lacked such a system of efficient bank supervision and bank bankruptcy 
proceedings. The liberal licensing policy led to the appearances of a great variety of financial 
agents, most of which turned out to be ponzi pyramids.
51 
It is also important to underline that the Bulgarian twin crisis was mainly a crisis in a closed 
economy environment. In contrast to the Asian crisis where foreign capital outflows were a 
                                                 
51A similar phenomenon was observed in Albania and partially in Romania. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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significant element (Mishkin (1999)), we did not observe such capital outflows in Bulgaria. This 
is due to the fact that over the entire transition period foreign capital inflows (particularly 
portfolio investments) were on a comparatively low level (compare table 7). Significant portfolio 
investments (primarily from Japanese banks) were observed not before the de facto introduction 
of the currency board arrangement in March 1997. In fact, only 204 million USD might be 
qualified as some kind of capital flight at the end of 1996 (BNB, 1996).
52 According to the BNB 
register (BNB, 1997) the share of foreign investors in government securities, issued for budget 
deficit financing, was 12.5% in the end of June 1997 and 11.1% in the end of December 1997. 
Concerning government securities issued for structural reforms, denominated in BGN and USD, 
the percentage of foreign investors was 22.6% in the end of June 1997 and 23.9% in the end of 
December 1997.  
On 1
st July 1997 the introductory balances of the Issue and Banking Department of BNB were 
published and this was considered to be the start of the Bulgarian Currency Board. This 
institutional solution was successful in stopping the Bulgarian Financial Crisis but also induced 
new problems to be discussed in the following section. 
 
5  Second generation currency boards and lending of last resort 
5.1 Second generation currency boards 
The features of classic currency boards, typical of the colonial system (we would rather call it 
first generation or orthodox currency boards) are well known in broad outlines (compare Schuler 
(1992) and Schwartz (1993)). An orthodox currency board completely rejects monetary policy. It 
entails real economy flexibility and balance of payments liberalization. A currency board is 
backed by a simple and clear rule which determines the relationship between balance of 
payments, reserve money (or money supply) and interest rate dynamics (compare Hanke and 
Schuler (1994) and Williamson (1995)). The possibility for discretionary intervention de facto 
does not exist. 
                                                 
52 Komulainen (2001, p. 23) did not include Bulgaria in the table described capital account reversals during the 
financial crises in emerging markets (Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Russia and Turkey) thereby de facto 
confirming the insignificance of capital outflows in the Bulgarian case. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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In contrast to the orthodox currency boards, second generation currency boards preserve the 
possibility of discretion and of conducting monetary policy.
53 How a second generation currency 
board gains this flexibility can best be demonstrated at the example of the BNB’s balance sheet. 
The central bank of Bulgaria (BNB) is divided into two departments - an Issue Department and a 
Banking Department (compare table 8).
54   
Table 8: Issue and banking departments balance sheets 
Issue department balance sheet 
ASSETS  LIABILITIES 
Cash and nostro accounts in foreign currency  Currency in circulation 
Monetary gold  Bank deposits and current accounts 
Foreign securities  Government deposits and accounts 
  Banking Department deposit 
 
Banking department balance sheet 
ASSETS  LIABILITIES 
Nonmonetary gold and other precious metals  Borrowings from IMF 
Investment in securities  Liabilities to other international financial institutions 
Loans and advances to banks  Capital 
Claims on government  Reserves 
Bulgarian’s IMF quota and holdings  
in other international financial institutions 
Retained profit 
Deposit with Issue Department   
 
The balance sheet of the Issue Department, which in practice plays the role of the currency board, 
includes international assets, covering the department’s liabilities. The liabilities are comprised of 
items typical of an orthodox currency board: banknotes and coins, and items typical of second 
generation currency boards: commercial bank reserves, government fiscal reserves and net worth 
expressed by the deposit of the Banking Department. The item recording the net worth of the 
                                                 
53 Central bank flexibility was preserved in different forms in Hong Kong, Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Bulgaria. See Tsang (1999), Caprio et al. (1996), Bennett (1993,1994), Camard (1996), Miller (1999), Haan et al. 
(2001), Nenovsky and Hristov (2002), Nenovsky et al. (2002), Ho (2002). 
54 This organization follows the model of the Bank of England, likewise divided into an issue department and a 
banking separtment. The Bank of Estonia has a similar structure. Unlike BNB and Bank of Estonia, the I ssue 
Department of the Bank of England does not hold foreign exchange as a backing for the note issue, but rather 
domestic securities.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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currency board also exists in the orthodox variant but in this case it only plays the role of a buffer 
which absorbs shocks triggered by asset operations. A positive net worth (expressed by a 
Banking Department deposit) allows second generation currency boards to perform at least some 
discretionary monetary policy and provides an opportunity for exercising a strictly limited 
LOLR-function in the case of systemic banking crisis (see below 5.2).  
The Banking Department deposit provides the link between the Issue Department and the 
Banking Department and also reflects the relationship between the government and the central 
bank. The relationship between the government and the International Monetary Fund passes 
through the central bank (article 45 of Law on the BNB). This is due to the fact that drawing 
rights, received from the IMF, are recorded twice in the balance sheet of the Banking 
Department. One the one hand the IMF quota is a liability of the Banking department with 
respect to the IMF, on the other hand it is an asset of the Banking department that is deposited in 
the Issue Department. Within 90 days of receipt, IMF-tranches are transferred to the government 
account whereby the Banking Department deposit decreases and the government deposit 
increases by the same amount.  In the balance sheet of the Banking Department this 
transformation is recorded by crediting the deposit at the Issue  Department and debiting the 
central bank lending to the government item. When the government does not utilize borrowings 
from the IMF they stay within the Banking Department deposit, thus providing larger funds for 
the currency board LOLR function.  
In principle, money supply under currency board arrangements is endogenous and is determined 
by the behavior of economic agents. The same rule holds true in setting reserve money and to a 
lower extent in broad money determination. In the latter case, the gap between money demand 
and supply is overcome by the changes in the price of money (its purchasing power) and of 
nonmonetary assets (interest rate, etc.).  Under second generation currency boards the main 
channels of monetary discretion could be divided into two types: traditional and new. The first 
type is associated with functions inherited from the classical central bank and the second is 
determined by the specific design of modern, second generation currency boards.  
According to classical central bank instruments, in most currency board countries  minimum 
required reserves were preserved to different degrees. In Bulgaria and Estonia minimum required 
reserves are set in the standard way, while in Argentina had so-called liquidity requirements: 
commercial banks were required to hold a portion of their reserves in high-liquid U.S. securities William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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(Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (2000)). This leaves room for central bank 
manipulation of reserve money and money supply through changes in the level and the reporting 
methodology for commercial bank minimum required reserves. Usually this tool is used quite 
sparingly though, despite existing opportunities. In the rare cases when this tool is employed it is 
mainly to respond to a banking crisis triggered by external shocks, rather than as an instrument of 
exerting discretionary impact on the money supply. The Argentine experience during the 
Mexican crisis indicates the role minimum required reserves could play under a currency board 
arrangement (Caprio et al. (1996)).  Contrary to other countries, Estonia very often uses the 
instrument of minimum required reserves. In practice, frequent manipulation of the instrument 
(more than 10 times since the launch of the currency board in 1991) comes close to central bank 
discretionary instruments of money supply regulation.
55 
In Bulgaria the level of minimum required reserves was set at 11 percent of the commercial bank 
deposit base upon the introduction of the currency board and has not been modified till June 
2000, despite the country’s exposure to adverse external shocks related to the Russian Financial 
Crisis and the war in Kosovo. In April 1998 the methodology of reporting minimum required 
reserves was modified to provide  more commercial bank autonomy and flexibility in liquidity 
management. Since July 2000 BNB has decreased minimum reserves requirements from 11 
percent to 8 percent. This decision represents the strategic long run policy of the central bank to 
gradually reduce the reserve requirements to the 2 percent Euro-area level. At the same time the 
decision was made to centralize government money within the central bank in order to offset 
shocks generated by the policy of the ministry of finance (establishment of a single fiscal account 
within the central bank).    
A second function of the central bank under a new generation currency board is to serve as a 
lender of last resort. We draw special attention to the LOLR-function in the following section. 
Another discretionary channel of monetary policy under second generation currency boards is 
given by the choice of liabilities that have to be backed by reserve currency and the degree of  
                                                 
55 See Nenovsky et al. (2002) and Sutella (2002). The other peculiarity of the Estonian currency board is the presence 
of certificates of deposit issued by the central bank (since March 1993). Although it is argued that CDs encourage 
development of the interbank market (serving as collateral), while being of a small volume, in strictu sensu they 
represent a departure from currency board principles (Aima (1998)). In Lithuania, besides reserve requirement and 
LOLR function, repo operations with treasury bills and auctions for time deposits were introduced in the summer of 
1997. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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backing. In first generation currency boards liabilities have to be backed at a 100 percent level 
and the assets to back currency board liabilities have to be issued by nonresidents. Departures 
from this principle provide possibilities for the pursuit of discretionary monetary policy.
56 
Inclusion of government fiscal reserves on the liability side of a currency board (i.e. covering 
them with international reserves) is the major channel of monetary policy transmission in the 
Bulgarian and Lithuanian  versions of currency boards. Therefore, revenue and expenditure 
policies have a direct impact on reserve money and money supply. In addition privatization 
revenues, which are a major part of foreign direct investment inflows in the country, go directly 
to the government deposit with the central bank. This mechanism creates a kind of automatic 
sterilization of foreign direct investment inflows as far as the central bank is obliged by law to 
invest its reserves in securities issued by nonresidents (in the case that those privatization 
revenues are not used to finance government expenditures). In other words, the government may 
conduct (intentionally or not) monetary discretion. This mechanism destroys the automatic link 
between balance of payments dynamics and reserve money dynamics (Nenovsky and Hristov 
(2002)). Under these circumstances money market disequilibria do not disappear with interest 
rate adjustment, as they do under an orthodox currency board, but rather require a management of 
government reserves in the central bank’s balance sheet. Using this opportunity, the government 
is capable of executing discretion, integrating fiscal and monetary policies into a  syncretic 
whole.
57  
                                                 
56 The Argentine model of a quasi currency board is indicative of the possibility of conducting monetary policy 
through establishing a certain limit for liability backing with international assets issued by nonresidents: not less than 
66.6 percent.  Within the remaining percentage the central bank of Argentina may hold securities issued by the 
Argentine government 
57 It is a well known fact that the Treasury Departments' activities affect the deposits held with central banks and 
therefore the liquidity situation in the countries. Extensive research has been conducted to explore treasury of 
treasury activity on the liquidity conditions and central banks monetary policies (Griffiths and Winters (1995), 
Hamilton (1997) and Almuina (1999) among others). The main difference under a currency board is that - since 
central banks do not conduct any kind of monetary policy operations - treasury activities create asymmetric liquidity 
shocks which could not be offset in practice by the central bank. For instance, Petrov (2000) concludes that treasury 
operations are the m ost significant source of shocks on Bulgarian interbank interest rates. Nenovsky et al. (2001) 
found liquidity effects when the fiscal reserve movements impact interbank interest rates. From our point of view 
major arguments in favor of the inclusion of government reserves on the liability side of the currency board balance 
are that free movement of capital and high capital mobility cause large capital flow volatility which directly William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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As we have already argued earlier, the Bulgarian Financial Crisis can be classified as a moral 
hazard driven crisis. BNB played a key role in the whole system by constantly refinancing 
commercial banks and the budget and by confusing monetary policy with the LOLR function. 
The main task of a currency board (as an extreme negation of monetary policy) was to destroy 
this system and to set strict budget restrictions on banks, the government and consequently on the 
real sector. Currency boards can just weaken but not eliminate the possibility of a financial 
crisis
58. The question arises how a currency board’s static characteristics can be combined with 
the ability to intervene in the case of a banking crisis. We will deal with this aspect in the 
following subsection. 
 
5.2 Lending of last resort under a currency board 
In contemporary financial systems lending of last resort is considered as a narrow part (at 
different degrees and aspects) of the safety net system (Freixas and Rochet (1999)). This is the 
reason why even under the currency board arrangements, defined as an antithesis to the discretion 
and “irresponsibility” of the LOLR, it seems to be hard to imagine to go to the opposite extreme 
and to eliminate LOLR functions completely. Difficulties arose from the fact that the complete 
intertwining of monetary policy and LOLR, which caused the Bulgarian Financial Crisis, left no 
room for distinguishing between the two functions.
59 However, currency boards provide an 
opportunity to return to some old forms of the LOLR. 
                                                                                                                                                              
influences reserve money and interest rates since they are automatically linked to the balance of payments. Under 
these circumstances government fiscal policy approximated with fiscal reserve dynamics in the balance sheet of the 
currency board may offset shocks and help smooth reserve money and interest rate fluctuations. In addition, it is 
argued that for countries like Bulgaria, which have a relatively high external debt (78 percent of GDP) and large 
annual service obligations, inclusion of government reserves in liabilities side and their backing with international 
reserves helps to enhance the currency board’s credibility. At the same time, such a design reduces reserve money 
volatility as large payments on external debt are accommodated by government reserves (Miller (1999)). 
 
58 Compare the model of banking fragility under  currency boards presented by Morin (2002). 
59 Some economists think that such a separation is impossible (Goodfriend and King (1988)), although in the 18th-
century Thornton and Bagehot tried to distinguish between them. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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First, since the currency board is a rule, it is logical to find analogies to the gold standard. It is 
well known that in the gold standard monetary system there were different versions of the LOLR 
(for a survey compare Bordo (1989) or Denise (2001)): (i) in the private banking sector this 
function was carried out by private clearing house associations (White (1999)) or by the so-called 
branch banking (in the case of USA); or the LOLR was imported by a foreign central bank 
(Goodhart (1987) argues that this was the case in the period of free banking in Scotland), (ii) 
under centralized gold standard international LOLR was performed by a temporary suspension of 
the rule of convertibility; it was intended that after the operations the rule would be restored
60 
(Bordo and Kydland (1995), Denise (2001)) and (iii) that a central bank could rely on support 
from abroad (Denise (2001)). In the latter case the help may come from a foreign central bank 
(for example the Bank of England was supported from the Banque de France in 1890, and several 
more times in the beginning of the 19th century) or from foreign private banks (as during the 
Barings’s crisis in 1889/1890).
61 
Second, under the new generation of currency boards the LOLR feature could be performed in 
two ways: (i) by balance sheet positions that are not typical for the currency board and (ii) by a 
separate independent fund (Caprio et al. (1996)). In the first case these could be some monetary 
instruments that will appear as internal assets in the currency board’s balance sheet (as, for 
instance the deposit certificates in Estonia and the repo operations in Lithuania) or as some 
monetary rule within the framework of the central bank. 
In the case of  Bulgaria, BNB may extend loans in BGN  to banks through the Banking 
Department (up to the level of central bank excess reserves) in the event of a liquidity risk 
affecting the stability of the banking system only to solvent banks experiencing an acute need of 
liquidity that cannot be provided from other sources. Such loans could be extended only against 
collateral of liquid assets and the loan repayment term shall not exceed three months. BNB's 
Regulation N6 defines liquidity risk as a situation where the amount of the ordered but unpaid 
payment documents in the Banking Integrated System for Electronic Transfer (BISERA) exceeds 
15 percent of its total amount for each of the last two days. In addition liquidity risk for the 
                                                 
60 In order to guarantee the restoration of the gold parity before 1866 the Bank of England for instance issued the so-
called letters of indemnity. 
61 It is possible that European Central Bank will carry out the LOLR function for Bulgaria (the country is in a process 
of EMU accession). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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banking system is a condition requiring that an individual bank delays or establishes that it is 
going to delay the settlement of the payment documents submitted to it for more than three days, 
and if the bank has at least an eight percent share of all interbank payments for each of the last 
five business days prior to filing a request for a loan with the BNB (BNB (1999)). 
The existence of branches and affiliates of major foreign banks is another opportunity for 
importing LOLR from abroad. Therefore, the strategy of most currency boards is to open the 
domestic market for the entrance of foreign banks. This is the experience of Argentina, Estonia 
and Bulgaria. Argentina is a particular case where the central bank agreed upon bilateral credit 
lines for financial support with American and other foreign banks.  
We will now turn to a discussion of the peculiarities of the LOLR function within the currency 
board arrangements. We shall consider the four classic features of LOLR defined by  Bagehot 
(1866)
62 as well as some of their contemporary characteristics (Freixas et al. (1999), Scialom 
(1999)).  
In contrast to Bagehot’s definition, under the conditions of modern currency boards, LOLR does 
not imply free (freely) refinancing and imposing a penalty rate, but rather limited refinancing at a 
penalty rate. According to Bagehot the LOLR should announce in advance that it will refinance 
freely during a crisis. In most of the contemporary currency boards, the conditions under which 
refinancing is possible are legally determined and as we have already pointed out, refinancing is 
not freely, but rather strictly limited (which is the case in Bulgaria). Similar to the advice given 
by Bagehot, modern LOLRs under the currency board arrangements stick to the principle to grant 
credits only against very good collateral. Bagehot’s principle to support only solvent banks with 
liquidity problems is realized in the most currency board arrangements while it is often hard to 
judge whether a certain bank asking for liquidity assistance is solvent or not. This information 
problem is even harder to solve in the short period of time the central bank has to decide on 
LOLR assistance (compare Goodhart and Huang (1999), p. 6). 
Under the new generation of currency boards, the intense presence of banking supervision, bank 
regulations and banking court proceedings is a vital part of the safety net. Such a system of 
efficient bank regulation is both, a prerequisite for the central bank to be able to serve as a lender 
                                                 
62 See also Bordo (1989) and Humphrey (1975). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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of last resort without creating moral hazard behavior and to compensate for the somewhat limited 
function of the central bank as a LOLR. It is not surprising that in most of the countries under a 
currency board arrangement, capital adequacy, liquidity and even equity requirements are 
significantly higher than those in countries with other monetary regimes.  
A well-designed system of deposit guarantee is of crucial importance as an additional part of the 
safety net. This system should not stimulate moral hazard and it should be more restrictive than it 
is in countries with discretionary acting central banks.
63 Deposit guarantee is determined by the 
nature of modern panic, which not always leads to a total contraction of the monetary base (as it 
was experienced under the gold standard). This panic usually moves deposits from “suspicious” 
and weak banks to ones of sound reputation (information based bank runs rather than random-
withdrawals). Such runs were observed during the Bulgarian crisis when depositors transferred 
their funds to healthy banks like Bulbank and State Savings Bank. There were similar runs 
throughout the banking crisis in Argentina in 1994/1995 with a currency board in operation but 
no safety net (Schumacher (2000)).
64 As soon as the crisis evolved depositors reallocated their 
money to big Argentine and foreign banks. 
Under a currency board the interbank market is of particular significance for liquidity control and 
an important element of the currency board mechanism. Taking a closer look at the Bulgarian 
practice, we observe that the interbank market does not function very well. Banks set up internal 
regulations for transferring liquidity to other banks case by case. In fact, there is no dialogue 
among the banks and this is a significant part of the ground for providing mutual aid in the case 
of a crisis (Freixas et al. (1999)). Above all, this phenomenon could be explained by the lack of 
trust among commercial banks induced by the 1996/1997 crisis. 
Principally it is possible to provide a central bank with LOLR functions even under a currency 
board arrangement (thereby fulfilling the set of requirements set up by Thornton and Bagehot). 
But it should be taken into account that any suspension of currency board principles might have 
severe negative consequences with respect to the credibility of the arrangement (Ho (2001)). 
Therefore, the Bulgarian currency board is designed to perform LOLR functions up to a certain 
                                                 
63 This conclusion is drawn in a review by Garcia (1999). Experience showed that the optimal amount of guarantee is 
in between once and twice the annual GDP per capita. For details about the specific features of deposit guaranteeing 
in transition countries compare Hermes and Lensink (2000), and for Bulgaria: Nenovsky and Petrov (2001). 
64 See also Caprio et al. (1996). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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limit without violating the basic rules for such an arrangement. LOLR functions can be financed 
via the Banking Department deposits, i.e. the net value of the currency board, as it is shown in 
table 9. 
Table 9: Example for balance sheets of Bulgarian Currency Board 
Balance Sheet of Issue Department 
ASSETS  LIABILITIES 
Net Foreign Assets [F] 
   Cash in foreign currency 
Currency in circulation [C] 
   Monetary gold  Bank deposits and current accounts [R]  (+ 100) 
   Foreign securities  Government deposits and accounts [G] 
  Banking department deposit [B]  (- 100) 
 
Balance sheet of Banking Department 
ASSETS  LIABILITIES 
Loans and advances to banks  (+ 100)  Borrowings from IMF  
Receivables from Government  Liabilities to other financial institutions 
Bulgaria’s IMF quota and holdings  
in other international financial institutions 
Capital 
Banking department deposit [B]  (- 100)    
 
We should also discuss the possibility of a temporary drift from the currency board rules. As the 
basic objective of second generation currency boards is monetary stabilization and in most of the 
cases these arrangements are put into practice after a period of hyperinflation or a financial crisis, 
any break of the currency board rules (reserve money backing and fixed exchange rate) will 
likely be considered as a return to financial instability or inflation (with respect to the theoretical 
models we reviewed in section 2 we might think of this to be the cause of a change in market 
expectations causing the economy to jump from a “good” equlibrium to a “bad” one). While the 
gold standard principle worked for quite a long period of time, was an international agreement William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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and surely had also educational purposes (for the monetary authorities and the public), currency 
boards typically have operating for considerably short periods of time
65 and are typically put into 
practice because of national instabilities. In addition to that only a few countries work with a 
currency board arrangement. 
Altogether, the experience of the current currency boards shows that the LOLR-function is 
exercised only very rarely. For example, during the 5 -year existence of Bulgaria’s currency 
board, BNB did never made use of its LOLR function, although two banks suffered some 
liquidity difficulties. Both banks were considerably small and failed. In the beginning of 1999 
Credit Bank was declared to be insolvent (BNB (1998)) and in the beginning of the following 
year Bulgarian Universal Bank went bankrupt (BNB (2000)). This experience shows that a 
restrictive definition of the LOLR-function might be sufficient to provide the necessary stability 
to the financial sector thereby preventing bank runs from occurring.   
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The above expositions showed that Bulgaria’s 1996/1997 Financial Crisis was primarily (but not 
only) due to heavy moral hazard behavior of the banking sector.  Thus Bulgaria’s crisis might 
serve as an outstanding example for a moral hazard driven crisis in the tradition of the Dooley 
(1997) and Krugman (1998) models. Different from the typical assumption of third generation 
currency crisis models the moral hazard behavior was (at least initially) not induced by explicit 
governmental guarantees but by the unchanged public belief that the government will care about 
industries and banks facing bankruptcy problems. These beliefs were reinforced by the 
government’s effective behavior and resulted in systematic moral hazard behavior. When the 
public started to worry about the governments’ ability and willingness to continue this policy a 
banking crisis was triggered which was reinforced by governmental bail-out guarantees. Both, 
theorist and practitioners seem to have underestimated the special moral hazard risk in transition 
countries. 
The following conclusions might be drawn: 
                                                 
65 The oldest is the currency in Hong-Kong  (since 1983) and even this arrangement can hardly be  compared to 
the „century“ of the gold standard (compare Caprio et al. (1996)). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 464 
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•  The twin crisis in Bulgaria of 1996/1997  underlines both the importance and the 
vulnerability of banking systems in transition countries. On the one hand a strong banking 
system is needed to provide financing of investments (since a capital market based 
financing is often impossible). On the other hand the process of transition needs time and 
holds the risk to be interrupted. The transformation process is often a time of soft budget 
constraints that might end up in a deep financial crisis, as the Bulgarian example showed. 
•  The sudden shift from an extremely loose to an extremely restrictive refinancing politics 
is likely to generate a currency crisis. If this restrictive policy is accompanied by a 
significant direct budget financing, the crisis is reinforced. The high interest rates put an 
excessive burden on internal debt servicing as well as on commercial banks. 
(Not only) the Bulgarian experience showed that the set up a new institutional structure of the 
banking system and especially the role of the central bank might be useful to stabilize a crisis 
economy. Bulgaria decided to introduce a currency board arrangement. In fact, this is not the 
only possible solution but – at least up to now – a successful way to impose discipline into the 
banking  system. To be less prone to future financial crises, Bulgaria introduced a second 
generation currency board that allows the central bank to act as a strictly limited lender of last 
resort.  
In the light of the recent Argentine “Tango Crisis”, culminating in the abandonment of the 
currency board on the USD in January 2002 the question arises whether the Bulgarian currency 
board system is still adequate. Or to put the question in a different way: what makes the 
Bulgarian situation different from the Argentine one? While it is not the subject of this study to 
compare the Argentine and the Bulgarian currency board at length we shall make a few remarks 
with respect to the above questions.  
We suggest that the Bulgarian currency board arrangement is less prone to financial crises than 
the Argentine one because: 
•  the Bulgarian Currency Board is comparatively more orthodox than the former Argentine 
arrangement (full reserve money backing and strictly limited LOLR-function)
66. On the 
one hand the strictly limited LOLR-function is reducing moral hazard behavior what was 
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identified to be one of the major reasons for the Bulgarian Currency Crisis of 1996/1997. 
On the other hand and argued in line with the Diamond-Dybvig-model the limited LOLR-
function might increase the risk of bank runs due to random withdrawals. This tradeoff is 
hardly to be discussed away but according to the specific Bulgarian experiences the 
restriction of the LOLR-role of BNB seems to be adequate. To minimize the risk of bank 
runs Bulgaria introduced a more efficient system of bank regulation and supervision than 
before the 1996/1997 financial crisis. 
•  Bulgaria did significantly better in deciding on its reserve currency as Argentina. 
Argentina chose to peg the Peso against USD although there are no significant exports to 
the United States of America. When the Real, the currency of Argentina’s most important 
export region Brazil, started to devalue against USD in January 1999, the Argentine 
economy got more and more uncompetitive and dropped into a deep recession. While 
Bulgaria is surely not an important trade partner for the major EU member countries, 
more than 60 percent of Bulgaria’s foreign trade is organized with EU members. That is 
why Bulgaria decided to choose Euro as anchor currency. Since even a second generation 
currency board only allows for a low degree of active monetary policy the question 
whether Bulgaria will be able to stick to its currency board arrangement will also depend 
on the question whether Bulgaria is hit by asymmetric shocks with respect to the EMU 
countries. In a recent empirical study Weimann (2001) showed, using an vector-
autoregressive model, that the Bulgarian economy is positively correlated with the EMU 
member countries at least as far as output-persistent shocks are concerned. Thus, Bulgaria 
seems to be not a worse candidate for EMU-accession than the Czech Republic or 
Hungary.
67 Weimann (2001) also found Bulgaria not to be in a worse position than e.g. 
Greece or Portugal was in the eve of their EMU-accession. Altogether these findings also 
indicate that Bulgaria’s decision to peg its currency board first to Deutsche Mark and later 
on to the Euro was surely better than to use the U.S. Dollar as reserve currency.  
•  Argentina’s decision to introduce a currency board arrangement in 1989 was an attempt to 
end a long period of recession and hyperinflation. Even if the concrete situation of 
Argentina and Bulgaria can obviously not be compared, it has to be admitted that the 
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motive to introduce the Bulgarian Currency Board was quite similar. Nevertheless there is 
an important difference with respect to the time-horizon of the monetary strategies in both 
countries. Even if price stability was restored soon after the introduction of the Argentine 
Currency Board, Argentina did not consider to change its monetary strategy in the 
foreseeable future – maybe due to the fear, that hyperinflation could be back, soon. In 
contrast to that, Bulgaria  is currently in the process of qualifying for EU- and EMU-
accession (even if on a comparative early stage).
68 Thus, the currency board system is not 
more than a transitional episode – even if it is currently unclear when exactly Bulgaria 
might expect to be admitted to take part in EMU. To be able to qualify for EMU, what is 
expected by the government and the public to be advantageous for the country, Bulgaria 
has to follow a stable fiscal policy. In fact Bulgaria’s fiscal discipline was quite high since 
the introduction of the currency board arrangement in early 1997. Furthermore, a recent 
study shows that the dangers of so-called Balassa-Samuelson effects on price dynamics in 
Bulgaria are largely exaggerated (Nenovsky and Dimitrova, 2002). 
•  Argentina’s working class wields enormous power thereby preventing almost all attempts 
to make the labor market more flexible. Unions in Bulgaria are much weaker allowing for 
a much larger degree of labor market flexibility. Real wage flexibility is a major condition 
for absorbing shocks in an economy under a static central bank and a key element of 
automatic adjustment mechanisms of currency boards. Empirical estimations (Nenovsky 
and Koleva, 2001) show that the currency board in Bulgaria exerts pressure on labour 
market changes, particularly on its institutional structure. The index of real wage rigidity 
(Vinals and Jimeno’s methodology)
69 in the state sector indicates a considerably increased 
flexibility after the introduction of the currency board. Nevertheless, real wages in 
Bulgaria are much more inelastic than in the EU and industrialised countries.  
•  more than half of Argentina’s exports are food and farm commodities. The prices of these 
goods are heavily depressed by the subsidies in the United States and the EU. At the end 
of year 2000 consumer goods represented 29.9% of Bulgarian exports and  food only 
3.3% (BNB, 2000).  The main export items are raw materials feedstocks (44.1%), energy 
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commodities (14.6%) and investment goods (11.5%). In any case, Bulgaria as a candidate 
for EU-accession has some advantages in this respect resulting from association-
agreements with EU. In addition to that Bulgaria profits from EU-subsidies which are 
intended to build up a healthy economy in Bulgaria before entering EU and EMU.
70 
•  last but not least Bulgarian internal debt is at a comparatively low level and primarily 
BGN-denominated (different to Argentina where a significant part of the internal debt is 
USD-denominated.  
Altogether, we therefore judge the Bulgarian Currency Board to be more stable than the 
Argentine one. H owever, no  fixed exchange rate regime  is  immune to crises. Thus, our 
conclusions are statements on probabilities rather than on possibilities. 
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